CWE-400 未加控制的资源消耗(资源穷尽)

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption

结构: Simple

Abstraction: Class

状态: Draft

被利用可能性: High

基本描述

The software does not properly control the allocation and maintenance of a limited resource thereby enabling an actor to influence the amount of resources consumed, eventually leading to the exhaustion of available resources.

扩展描述

Limited resources include memory, file system storage, database connection pool entries, and CPU. If an attacker can trigger the allocation of these limited resources, but the number or size of the resources is not controlled, then the attacker could cause a denial of service that consumes all available resources. This would prevent valid users from accessing the software, and it could potentially have an impact on the surrounding environment. For example, a memory exhaustion attack against an application could slow down the application as well as its host operating system.

There are at least three distinct scenarios which can commonly lead to resource exhaustion:

Resource exhaustion problems are often result due to an incorrect implementation of the following situations:

相关缺陷

  • cwe_Nature: ChildOf cwe_CWE_ID: 664 cwe_View_ID: 1000 cwe_Ordinal: Primary

适用平台

Language: {'cwe_Class': 'Language-Independent', 'cwe_Prevalence': 'Undetermined'}

常见的影响

范围 影响 注释
Availability ['DoS: Crash, Exit, or Restart', 'DoS: Resource Consumption (CPU)', 'DoS: Resource Consumption (Memory)', 'DoS: Resource Consumption (Other)'] The most common result of resource exhaustion is denial of service. The software may slow down, crash due to unhandled errors, or lock out legitimate users.
['Access Control', 'Other'] ['Bypass Protection Mechanism', 'Other'] In some cases it may be possible to force the software to "fail open" in the event of resource exhaustion. The state of the software -- and possibly the security functionality - may then be compromised.

检测方法

Automated Static Analysis

Automated static analysis typically has limited utility in recognizing resource exhaustion problems, except for program-independent system resources such as files, sockets, and processes. For system resources, automated static analysis may be able to detect circumstances in which resources are not released after they have expired. Automated analysis of configuration files may be able to detect settings that do not specify a maximum value.

Automated static analysis tools will not be appropriate for detecting exhaustion of custom resources, such as an intended security policy in which a bulletin board user is only allowed to make a limited number of posts per day.

Automated Dynamic Analysis

Certain automated dynamic analysis techniques may be effective in spotting resource exhaustion problems, especially with resources such as processes, memory, and connections. The technique may involve generating a large number of requests to the software within a short time frame.

Fuzzing

While fuzzing is typically geared toward finding low-level implementation bugs, it can inadvertently find resource exhaustion problems. This can occur when the fuzzer generates a large number of test cases but does not restart the targeted software in between test cases. If an individual test case produces a crash, but it does not do so reliably, then an inability to handle resource exhaustion may be the cause.

可能的缓解方案

Architecture and Design

策略:

Design throttling mechanisms into the system architecture. The best protection is to limit the amount of resources that an unauthorized user can cause to be expended. A strong authentication and access control model will help prevent such attacks from occurring in the first place. The login application should be protected against DoS attacks as much as possible. Limiting the database access, perhaps by caching result sets, can help minimize the resources expended. To further limit the potential for a DoS attack, consider tracking the rate of requests received from users and blocking requests that exceed a defined rate threshold.

Architecture and Design

策略:

Mitigation of resource exhaustion attacks requires that the target system either: The first of these solutions is an issue in itself though, since it may allow attackers to prevent the use of the system by a particular valid user. If the attacker impersonates the valid user, they may be able to prevent the user from accessing the server in question. The second solution is simply difficult to effectively institute -- and even when properly done, it does not provide a full solution. It simply makes the attack require more resources on the part of the attacker.

Architecture and Design

策略:

Ensure that protocols have specific limits of scale placed on them.

Implementation

策略:

Ensure that all failures in resource allocation place the system into a safe posture.

示例代码

The following example demonstrates the weakness.

bad Java

class Worker implements Executor {
...
public void execute(Runnable r) {

try {
...
}
catch (InterruptedException ie) {

// postpone response
Thread.currentThread().interrupt();
}
}

public Worker(Channel ch, int nworkers) {
...
}

protected void activate() {

Runnable loop = new Runnable() {

public void run() {

try {
for (;;) {
Runnable r = ...;
r.run();
}
}
catch (InterruptedException ie) {
...
}
}
};
new Thread(loop).start();
}
}

There are no limits to runnables. Potentially an attacker could cause resource problems very quickly.

This code allocates a socket and forks each time it receives a new connection.

bad C

sock=socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
while (1) {
newsock=accept(sock, ...);
printf("A connection has been accepted\n");
pid = fork();
}

The program does not track how many connections have been made, and it does not limit the number of connections. Because forking is a relatively expensive operation, an attacker would be able to cause the system to run out of CPU, processes, or memory by making a large number of connections. Alternatively, an attacker could consume all available connections, preventing others from accessing the system remotely.

In the following example a server socket connection is used to accept a request to store data on the local file system using a specified filename. The method openSocketConnection establishes a server socket to accept requests from a client. When a client establishes a connection to this service the getNextMessage method is first used to retrieve from the socket the name of the file to store the data, the openFileToWrite method will validate the filename and open a file to write to on the local file system. The getNextMessage is then used within a while loop to continuously read data from the socket and output the data to the file until there is no longer any data from the socket.

bad C

int writeDataFromSocketToFile(char *host, int port)
{

char filename[FILENAME_SIZE];
char buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];
int socket = openSocketConnection(host, port);

if (socket < 0) {
printf("Unable to open socket connection");
return(FAIL);
}
if (getNextMessage(socket, filename, FILENAME_SIZE) > 0) {
if (openFileToWrite(filename) > 0) {
while (getNextMessage(socket, buffer, BUFFER_SIZE) > 0){
if (!(writeToFile(buffer) > 0))
break;
}
}
closeFile();
}
closeSocket(socket);
}

This example creates a situation where data can be dumped to a file on the local file system without any limits on the size of the file. This could potentially exhaust file or disk resources and/or limit other clients' ability to access the service.

In the following example, the processMessage method receives a two dimensional character array containing the message to be processed. The two-dimensional character array contains the length of the message in the first character array and the message body in the second character array. The getMessageLength method retrieves the integer value of the length from the first character array. After validating that the message length is greater than zero, the body character array pointer points to the start of the second character array of the two-dimensional character array and memory is allocated for the new body character array.

bad C


/ process message accepts a two-dimensional character array of the form [length][body] containing the message to be processed /
int processMessage(char *message)
{
char body;

int length = getMessageLength(message[0]);

if (length > 0) {
body = &message[1][0];
processMessageBody(body);
return(SUCCESS);
}
else {
printf("Unable to process message; invalid message length");
return(FAIL);
}
}

This example creates a situation where the length of the body character array can be very large and will consume excessive memory, exhausting system resources. This can be avoided by restricting the length of the second character array with a maximum length check

Also, consider changing the type from 'int' to 'unsigned int', so that you are always guaranteed that the number is positive. This might not be possible if the protocol specifically requires allowing negative values, or if you cannot control the return value from getMessageLength(), but it could simplify the check to ensure the input is positive, and eliminate other errors such as signed-to-unsigned conversion errors (CWE-195) that may occur elsewhere in the code.

good C

unsigned int length = getMessageLength(message[0]);
if ((length > 0) && (length < MAX_LENGTH)) {...}

In the following example, a server object creates a server socket and accepts client connections to the socket. For every client connection to the socket a separate thread object is generated using the ClientSocketThread class that handles request made by the client through the socket.

bad Java

public void acceptConnections() {
try {
ServerSocket serverSocket = new ServerSocket(SERVER_PORT);
int counter = 0;
boolean hasConnections = true;
while (hasConnections) {
Socket client = serverSocket.accept();
Thread t = new Thread(new ClientSocketThread(client));
t.setName(client.getInetAddress().getHostName() + ":" + counter++);
t.start();
}
serverSocket.close();


} catch (IOException ex) {...}
}

In this example there is no limit to the number of client connections and client threads that are created. Allowing an unlimited number of client connections and threads could potentially overwhelm the system and system resources.

The server should limit the number of client connections and the client threads that are created. This can be easily done by creating a thread pool object that limits the number of threads that are generated.

good Java

public static final int SERVER_PORT = 4444;
public static final int MAX_CONNECTIONS = 10;
...

public void acceptConnections() {
try {
ServerSocket serverSocket = new ServerSocket(SERVER_PORT);
int counter = 0;
boolean hasConnections = true;
while (hasConnections) {
hasConnections = checkForMoreConnections();
Socket client = serverSocket.accept();
Thread t = new Thread(new ClientSocketThread(client));
t.setName(client.getInetAddress().getHostName() + ":" + counter++);
ExecutorService pool = Executors.newFixedThreadPool(MAX_CONNECTIONS);
pool.execute(t);
}
serverSocket.close();


} catch (IOException ex) {...}
}

分析过的案例

标识 说明 链接
CVE-2009-2874 Product allows attackers to cause a crash via a large number of connections. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-2874
CVE-2009-1928 Malformed request triggers uncontrolled recursion, leading to stack exhaustion. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-1928
CVE-2009-2858 Chain: memory leak (CWE-404) leads to resource exhaustion. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-2858
CVE-2009-2726 Driver does not use a maximum width when invoking sscanf style functions, causing stack consumption. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-2726
CVE-2009-2540 Large integer value for a length property in an object causes a large amount of memory allocation. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-2540
CVE-2009-2299 Web application firewall consumes excessive memory when an HTTP request contains a large Content-Length value but no POST data. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-2299
CVE-2009-2054 Product allows exhaustion of file descriptors when processing a large number of TCP packets. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2009-2054
CVE-2008-5180 Communication product allows memory consumption with a large number of SIP requests, which cause many sessions to be created. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-5180
CVE-2008-2121 TCP implementation allows attackers to consume CPU and prevent new connections using a TCP SYN flood attack. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-2121
CVE-2008-2122 Port scan triggers CPU consumption with processes that attempt to read data from closed sockets. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-2122
CVE-2008-1700 Product allows attackers to cause a denial of service via a large number of directives, each of which opens a separate window. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-1700
CVE-2007-4103 Product allows resource exhaustion via a large number of calls that do not complete a 3-way handshake. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-4103
CVE-2006-1173 Mail server does not properly handle deeply nested multipart MIME messages, leading to stack exhaustion. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2006-1173
CVE-2007-0897 Chain: anti-virus product encounters a malformed file but returns from a function without closing a file descriptor (CWE-775) leading to file descriptor consumption (CWE-400) and failed scans. https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-0897

Notes

Theoretical Vulnerability theory is largely about how behaviors and resources interact. "Resource exhaustion" can be regarded as either a consequence or an attack, depending on the perspective. This entry is an attempt to reflect the underlying weaknesses that enable these attacks (or consequences) to take place. Other

分类映射

映射的分类名 ImNode ID Fit Mapped Node Name
CLASP Resource exhaustion (file descriptor, disk space, sockets, ...)
OWASP Top Ten 2004 A9 CWE More Specific Denial of Service
WASC 10 Denial of Service
WASC 41 XML Attribute Blowup
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) SER12-J Avoid memory and resource leaks during serialization
The CERT Oracle Secure Coding Standard for Java (2011) MSC05-J Do not exhaust heap space
Software Fault Patterns SFP13 Unrestricted Consumption

相关攻击模式

  • CAPEC-147
  • CAPEC-197
  • CAPEC-492
  • CAPEC-82

引用