[原文]The original design of TCP does not check that the TCP sequence number in an ICMP error message is within the range of sequence numbers for data that has been sent but not acknowledged (aka "TCP sequence number checking"), which makes it easier for attackers to forge ICMP error messages for specific TCP connections and cause a denial of service, as demonstrated using (1) blind connection-reset attacks with forged "Destination Unreachable" messages, (2) blind throughput-reduction attacks with forged "Source Quench" messages, or (3) blind throughput-reduction attacks with forged ICMP messages that cause the Path MTU to be reduced. NOTE: CVE-2004-0790, CVE-2004-0791, and CVE-2004-1060 have been SPLIT based on different attacks; CVE-2005-0065, CVE-2005-0066, CVE-2005-0067, and CVE-2005-0068 are related identifiers that are SPLIT based on the underlying vulnerability. While CVE normally SPLITs based on vulnerability, the attack-based identifiers exist due to the variety and number of affected implementations and solutions that address the attacks instead of the underlying vulnerabilities.
Multiple Vendor TCP Implementation Malformed Sequence Number Range Issue
Remote / Network Access
Loss of Integrity
Multiple TCP implementations contains a flaw that may allow a remote attacker to forge ICMP error messages. The problem is that the TCP sequence number in an ICMP error message is not checked whether it is within the range of sequence numbers for data that has been sent but not acknowledged. It is possible that the flaw may allow a remote attacker to forge ICMP error messages resulting in a loss of integrity.
Currently, there are no known upgrades, patches, or workarounds available to correct this issue.